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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is time to rethink character evidence. Long notorious as the most 
frequently litigated evidence issue, character doctrine plagues courts, 
trial lawyers, and law students with its infamously “grotesque” array of 
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nonsensical rules, whimsical distinctions, and arcane procedures.
1
 Most 
troubling is our confusion over the very notion of character itself. 
What is character? Some legal authorities leave the word undefined. 
Others profess not to know what it means, a troubling concession be-
cause character is a core concept of evidence law. Still others ponder 
whether character carries a “moral” element—“honesty” qualifies but 
being a “good driver” does not. Many commentators, perhaps most, see 
character as a psychological conceit, a kind of psychic nugget that drives 
or determines human conduct. They posit that current evidence law is 
based on an outmoded school of psychology, so-called “trait theory,” 




The legal profession is not alone in its consternation over character. 
Historians often speak about a “national character” or a “type” of per-
son,
3
 sometimes serving up hazy distinctions between an individual’s 
“private side” and more visible “public side.”
4
 Character, then, offers 
useful generalizations about human conduct that are widely accepted, 
readily understood, and yet left conveniently vague in a host of settings. 
Simply stated, character, like race, is a social and cultural con-
struct.
5
 The assumption that character is or should be grounded in psy-
chology or any science is unwarranted and inaccurate. Character, as we 
will see, is a function of our popular culture. Character consists of labels 
and names—sometimes ugly (e.g., “lazy”)—that are often expressed in 
the crude vernacular of everyday life. They are also contingent, differing 
among groups based on region, class, ethnicity, race, and religion. Their 
crudeness, fluidity, and amorphousness readily explain why evidence law 
has had such great difficulty defining character and so little regard for its 
probative value as proof of past events. 
                                                 
 1. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948), discussed at infra text accompa-
nying notes 61–62 and 280–296. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 318–325. 
 3. See David Brooks, The Rediscovery of Character, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A27 (em-
phasizing that character is “formed in groups” and inculcates “self control”); see also J. Birnbaum, J. 
Elson & L. Morrow, Busybodies & Crybabies: What’s Happening to the American Character?, 
TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 14 (cover story). 
 4. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 37 (1993). These noted 
historians also puzzle over character’s evolution from a public “reputation” to an individual’s “per-
sonality.” Id. Historians often portray the nation’s founding through the character of its “fathers,” 
though the term is left undefined. E.g., JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE 
INVENTION OF AMERICA (2010); GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE 
THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT (2006). 
 5. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WATERGATE TO 
BUSH V. GORE 307 (2005). 
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In sum, character is a calculation of social worth and value; it is the 
sum total of what others think of us, whether expressed as their own 
opinion or the collective opinions of many (reputation). Once we grasp 
that character is a social construct, we are in a better position to address 
some of the problems that plague evidence law. For example, evidence 
law’s purported ban of character evidence is futile and misguided—
character is hardwired into our social relations. Moreover, character’s 
bases are changing in important and yet unexplored ways. Social media, 
for instance, now equals the backyard fence. The law must account for it. 
To provide needed clarity in evidence law, a historical, more con-
textualized understanding of character is essential. To that end, this arti-
cle develops three themes. 
First, it reviews the doctrinal and policy issues that have famously 
plagued character evidence, with an eye toward their origins. Even today, 
doctrine formulated in the early nineteenth century is embraced without 
an adequate understanding of how this context affects evidence law and 
trials. 
Second, it explores evidence law’s historical contingency, which is 
dependent upon prevailing cultural, economic, and social conditions. 
Modern “character” reflects middle-class values that first emerged in the 
nineteenth century and that remain a dominant, though contested, feature 
of American culture. In sum, the very meaning of “character” has dra-
matically changed over time despite the law’s penchant for treating it as 
a timeless abstraction. Evidence law’s roots in lay culture are underap-
preciated and frequently ignored, especially by those looking to science 
for answers. 
Third, “character” has changed over time because it is often a cul-
tural, social, and ideological battleground. Rents in the social fabric are 
often expressed in cultural struggles over values and ideas, as best seen 
in the recent “Occupy” movement.
6
 This social and cultural divide, par-
ticularly criticisms of middle-class values, contributes to the law’s angst 
over character’s meaning and, perhaps, the law’s yearning for a scientific 
solution. Struggles over character reflect broad, deep, and significant 
concerns about human autonomy and liberal values, which are under-
played in legal scholarship.
7
 Put differently, character law models a set of 
liberal values that are stridently contested today. 
Part II of this article illustrates the diverse ways character proof 
arises at trial through three episodes. The first episode involves the use of 
celebrity character witnesses (e.g., Theodore Roosevelt) to influence a 
                                                 
 6. See e.g., OCCUPY WALL ST., http://occupywallst.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2013). 
 7. See discussion infra Part V. 
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trial’s outcome. The second episode draws from Michelson v. United 
States, a 1947 case famous for Justice Robert Jackson’s elucidation of all 
that is “grotesque” about character evidence. The third episode draws 
from a recent New York murder trial as recounted by one juror, a promi-
nent historian of science who finds the law’s disdain for character “quix-
otic” and “perverse.” 
Part III explores how modern law treats character proof. Although 
rules prohibit most uses of character as propensity evidence, they are 
riddled with exceptions and frequently evaded. Demeanor and “back-
ground” evidence effectively permit character proof to operate sub rosa 
at trial. 
Part IV is the article’s core, exploring the changing social and cul-
tural meaning of “character” over time and its related role in trials. More 
specifically, it contrasts the dramatic shift in the meaning of character in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—from one’s place in a rigid so-
cial hierarchy to the now familiar middle-class values of “self-culture” 
and “self-improvement” that served a burgeoning market economy, a 
fluid society, and a democratic polity. Quintessentially liberal and domi-
nating both scientific and popular thought, the new character model cele-
brated autonomy and free will. A seismic shift also occurred in the trial. 
The eighteenth-century trial gave prime importance to character. Yet the 
modern trial, specifically its evidence rules, purportedly banished charac-
ter largely in the name of controlling jury factfinding and irrespective of 
character’s significance socially and culturally. 
Part V discusses contemporary legal doctrine in a historical context. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence largely retain the common law’s “quixot-
ic” approach that “perversely” prohibits character as propensity evidence 
while otherwise assuming an identity between legal and popular concep-
tions of character.
8
 Legal critics, however, are uncertain about charac-
ter’s meaning in the wake of attacks upon middle-class values since the 
late 1960s and the culture wars of the last two decades. In sum, liberal 
values long embedded in evidence law are in flux and at times bitterly 
contested. Science beckons in the absence of social consensus as charac-
ter (social “types”) morphs into “personality” (individuals as “unique” 
beings). The problem is that the link between character and culture pass-
es unrecognized. 
Part VI concludes by discussing the implications of recognizing and 
embracing character’s social and cultural nature for trials and evidence 
law. “Character” is not a scientific construct, nor should we swap “per-
                                                 
 8. See discussion infra Parts III.A., V.A. 
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sonality” for character.
9
 Above all, the law should not turn its head from 
the reality that character permeates trials regardless of rules that wish it 
away. Rules also must accommodate today’s fluctuating values. For ex-
ample, it is suggested that the foundations for opinion and reputation be 
given greater rigor, that social media be taken into account when as-
sessing the subject’s character, and that serious thought be given to jetti-
soning outmoded constructs such as the exquisitely Victorian notion of 
“truthful character.” 
II. CHARACTER PROOF AT TRIAL: 3 EPISODES 
How is character used at trial? Why is it offered? Below are three 
instances, drawn across time, that illuminate the roles character plays at 
trial. 
The first episode involves celebrities used as character witnesses in 
a highly publicized case. It illustrates how and, perhaps, why character 
serves as a proxy for social standing—why who you are is as important 
as what you did. The second episode focuses on one of evidence law’s 
most famous cases, Michelson v. United States, in an effort to better un-
derstand the common law’s technical labyrinths in an otherwise run-of-
the-mill prosecution. Michelson especially reveals the pitfalls of opening 
doors to character that perhaps should remain closed. The third episode 
also involves a routine case, this time a homicide, but one in which the 
parties presented no character evidence as such. It reveals, however, that 
juries, like judges and lawyers, search for character proof regardless of 
what evidence is presented to or withheld from them. 
A. Theodore Roosevelt and the Character Witness As Celebrity. 
Financial scandals are familiar occurrences in United States history 
that inevitably attract public interest. In 1915 scandal rocked the venera-
ble Riggs Bank of Washington, D.C., when bookkeeping irregularities 
surfaced and authorities suspected self-dealing by insiders. The investi-
gation led to perjury charges against C.C. Glover, the bank’s president, 
and several other employees.
10
 Glover’s business relationships and active 
involvement in the D.C. community brought him into contact with some 
of the nation’s most prominent men, connections that proved useful 
when the case against him went to trial in May 1916. 
Because the Government sought to take Glover down in a public 
prosecution, the defense capitalized on Glover’s long list of prominent 
                                                 
 9. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, MAKING THE AMERICAN SELF 122 (1997).    
 10. Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1916. One suspects the prosecu-
tors settled on perjury charges because they could not prove criminal conduct connected to the ac-
counting irregularities. 
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admirers. United States senators, former ambassadors, church leaders, 
newspaper executives, and even the head of the Smithsonian Institution 
testified to Glover’s good character.
11
 Former President William Howard 




The character testimony provided by another former President, 
Theodore Roosevelt, provided the trial’s centerpiece. Anticipating Roo-
sevelt’s appearance, the New York Times ran a story the morning Roose-
velt testified.
13
 Crowds “enthusiastically” cheered Roosevelt on the 
streets as he approached the courthouse.
14
 When Colonel Roosevelt en-
tered the courtroom more “shouts . . . echoed far down the corridors of 
the old building and out to the curb.”
15
 For good effect, his oldest daugh-
ter, the popular and effervescent Alice Longworth, accompanied the 
Colonel and watched her father’s testimony, along with many other “well 
known Washington society women.”
16
 
Roosevelt’s testimony did not disappoint.
17
 When called to the 
stand, the Colonel solemnly “bowed low” to the judge. Asked his occu-
pation, the Colonel responded simply, “Writer,” which, according to the 
New York Times, “produced a ripple of merriment over the court 
room.”
18
 The laughter represented no disrespect to the court or to the 
immodest Roosevelt.
19
 The jury required no introduction to Colonel 
Roosevelt, who fought bravely and famously in Cuba in 1898, served as 
President of the United States from 1901 to 1909, and ran again for the 
presidency on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912, the most successful third-
party showing in American history to this date. And at the time of the 
trial, Roosevelt publicly contemplated running against President Wood-
row Wilson later in 1916 because Wilson refused to fight the Germans in 
the Great War.
20
 In sum, the defense had offered as a character witness 
one of the most significant men in the United States and even the world. 
                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. Head of Riggs Bank Is Praised by Taft, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1916. 
 13. Roosevelt on Stand in Riggs Case Today, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1916. 
 14. Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. Glover’s lawyer, according to the newspaper account, referred to Roosevelt as “Colo-
nel” during the direct examination. After leaving the presidency in 1909, he preferred to be called 
“Colonel Roosevelt.” EDMUND MORRIS, COLONEL ROOSEVELT 11 (2010) (Roosevelt “cherished” 
the title “colonel” because it reflected his rank in the Reserve Army and his martial bravery while 
fighting in Cuba during the Spanish–American War). 
 16. Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, supra note 10. For Alice Longworth’s own sensational 
personality, see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 61–62. 
 17. See Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, supra note 10. 
 18. Id. Roosevelt had an excellent sense of humor and was a successful writer. MORRIS, supra 
note 15, at 63–64, 256. 
 19. On Roosevelt’s ego, see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 187. 
 20. For Roosevelt’s flirtations with the 1916 election, see id. at 456–57. 
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In assessing Roosevelt’s character testimony, it is difficult to sepa-
rate the witness’s outsized personality from the substance of his testimo-
ny
21
—which was clearly the whole point of calling him in the first place. 
Whatever the trial judge’s lawful authority, the Colonel assumed com-
mand. Using humor to underscore his confidence in Glover, he cracked 
that he did not know whether Glover voted for Taft or Wilson in 1912 
but knew “he was against me.”
22
 The judge, jury, and spectators 
laughed.
23
 Yet, at one point, the plainly irritated judge warned the audi-
ence against further laughter after Roosevelt seemed to poke a little fun 
at the law, if not the judge.
24
 The exchange came when the government 
objected that Roosevelt was straying too far from reputation and into his 
“personal confidence” in Glover. In a soft voice, the judge ruled that the 
Colonel should confine himself to “his general opinion of the man for the 
purpose of establishing his reputation and character . . . .” In response, 
Roosevelt “snappingly” chortled: “My general knowledge of Mr. Glover 
by common repute, by universal repute, was that his business integrity 
was such that naturally I and my children kept our accounts in his 
bank.”
25
 Such testimony obliterated any line between Roosevelt’s per-
sonal opinion of Glover and Glover’s ostensible reputation in the com-
munity. When the prosecutor moved to strike the Colonel’s answer, the 
judge “mildly” responded that the testimony would stand.
26
 
Clearly, neither the Colonel nor Glover’s defense lawyers felt much 
need to confine the Colonel’s character testimony to desiccated observa-
tions about Glover’s reputation. Roosevelt spoke of Glover as a “public 
spirited citizen” with whom Roosevelt consulted “at length about Rock 
Creek Park, the Potomac Park, and the small parks of Washington,” 
among other civic matters. Roosevelt traced his relationship with Glover 
back to the 1890s and Roosevelt’s short time as vice president before the 
assassination of President William McKinley in 1901.
27
 “[I]ntimate so-
cially” with Glover, Roosevelt claimed a “thorough knowledge of his 
business and financial integrity and standing.” Asked to describe their 
social relationship, the Colonel responded: 
                                                 
 21. Discussing the Colonel as a possible opponent in 1916, Woodrow Wilson sagely observed 
that “Roosevelt deals in personalities and does not argue upon facts and conditions.” Id. at 456 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). The same might be said about his testimony in Glover’s case. 
 22. Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, supra note 10. 
 23. Id. (warning the audience: “This is a court”). The 1912 election saw Wilson as the Demo-
cratic candidate, Taft as the Republican candidate, Roosevelt as the Bull Moose Party (Progressive) 
candidate, and Eugene Debs as the Socialist candidate. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. On Roosevelt’s distinctive diction and voice, see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 238–39. 
 26. Colonel Praises Accused Bank Men, supra note 10. 
 27. Id. Roosevelt was elected vice president in 1900. McKinley died in September 1901. 
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Mr. Glover was often a guest at our house, including being often a 
guest while I was at the White House. My children went frequently 
to his home, especially to his Summer home. They were continually 
there. I know Mr. Glover very well socially, and especially in con-
nection with his philanthropic work.
28
 
He underscored that their relationship was not political—which 
provoked his joke about Glover’s vote in 1912—but rather “social, busi-
ness and in connection with philanthropy.”
29
 His confidence in Glover’s 
integrity knew no bounds: “In business matters I kept my account at his 
bank and one or two, or two or three of my children kept separate ac-




Roosevelt then spoke about the other two defendants in a “some-
what similar encomium.”
31
 These men, he said, “had risen from the low-
est places in the bank right to the highest by sheer force of ability, indus-
try, and integrity, and their reputation was a fine symbol of what could 
be done under American conditions of life . . . .”
32
 Understandably un-
clear about the fine line between reputation and opinion, he admitted that 
he knew both “gentlemen personally but slightly.” Roosevelt then asked, 
“Is that proper, Judge?”
33
 And the judge answered affirmatively; by this 
point, the jury had heard Roosevelt’s opinions anyway. Defense coun-
sel’s final question for Roosevelt asked whether the Colonel appeared in 
court of his “own volition.”
34
 Sensing a perfect exit line, the Colonel 
smiled broadly and said, “And most gladly.” Apparently, the prosecutor 
attempted no cross-examination of the Colonel.
35
 
The trial lasted several more days before the jury “hastened” to ac-
quit Glover and his two co-defendants.
36
 It is difficult to know what role 
the character testimony played in the acquittal. Did it simply underscore 
doubt arising from the evidence or was it pivotal? Clearly, Roosevelt’s 
titanic reputation overshadowed Glover’s. The Colonel’s testimony, like 
that of Taft and other luminaries, did much more than provide infor-
mation about what kind of men the defendants were; rather, they effec-
tively told the jurors that they had nothing to fear for their own reputa-
                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (making no mention of any cross-examination). One sympathizes with the prosecutor’s 
reluctance to cross-examine Roosevelt. 
 36. Riggs Bank Heads Found Not Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1916. 
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tions or self-respect in acquitting Glover of perjury: The jurors stood in 
good company in thinking the defendants were innocent. 
More fundamentally, we see that character, borne of myriad social 
relationships and expressed in the argot of daily life, resists the law’s 
stilted protocols and shallow distinctions between “reputation” and 
“opinion.” Roosevelt comfortably folded his personal opinions of the 
defendants into their reputations in the community while sprinkling his 
opinion with specific examples of good conduct (e.g., Glover’s work on 
parks). Even the judge blurred the two, instructing the Colonel to provide 
his “general opinion for purpose of establishing reputation and charac-
ter.” The nouns and adjectives that describe character are drawn from 
familiar social and business relationships. Glover was a man of high 
“business integrity” and a “public spirited citizen,” his codefendants 
were men of “ability, industry, and integrity.” Coming from a man of 
Roosevelt’s accomplishments, who was also famous for defending his 




B. The Michelson Case: The Perilous Banality of                                
Character Evidence 
Unlike C.C. Glover, most criminal defendants are unable to sum-
mon a bevy of former presidents, senators, and the like to testify on their 
behalf. Illustrating the modest end of the character-evidence spectrum, 
we have Michelson v. United States,
38
 a run-of-the-mill prosecution that 
nonetheless yielded what remains a seminal case even after six decades.
39
 
Here, our focus is on how character proof was used at trial; later, we will 
examine Michelson’s doctrinal and policy analysis.
40
 
The government indicted Michelson for bribing a federal revenue 
agent in 1946.
41
 The agent testified that Michelson offered a bribe in ex-
change for a break on his taxes. The two met in a New York hotel, where 
                                                 
 37. About this same time Roosevelt litigated two cases in defense of his own character. 
MORRIS, supra note 15, at 277–82, 405–24. Glover’s trial is not an anomaly. Trials today occasion-
ally feature celebrity character witnesses. In defending himself against charges of governmental 
corruption, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska called Colin Powell and Hawaii Senator Daniel Inoyue as 
character witnesses. Colin Powell Goes to Bat for Stevens, CBS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-4513344.html. 
 38. 335 U.S. 469 (1948). 
 39. E.g., RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF 
SCIENCE AND STATUTES 351 (6th ed. 2007) (“the leading Supreme Court precedent”). 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 280–296. 
 41. Michelson was tried on two related counts, one for “bribing” the agent and another for 
“offering” the bribe. The court of appeals reversed his conviction on the latter count. See United 
States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 734 (2d Cir. 1948) (reversing the “offering” count for lack of 
venue). Only the bribery count was before the Supreme Court. See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 470 n.1. 
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Michelson turned over $5,000 in a bag.
42
 There was no dispute over the 
payment, only what induced it. 
In his defense, Michelson testified that he was the victim of a 
shakedown, claiming that he turned over the cash in response to the 
agent’s “demands, threats, solicitations, and inducements.”
43
 On direct 
examination, Michelson’s lawyer had him testify to a 1927 conviction 
for a misdemeanor involving counterfeit watch dials. Why? Knowing 
that the prosecution would elicit the 1927 conviction on cross-
examination anyway, Michelson’s lawyer likely attempted to soften the 
blow by disclosing it first, thereby eliminating some drama and empha-
sizing his client’s candor.
44
 Nevertheless, on cross-examination, the 
prosecution forced Michelson to admit that he had answered “no” on a 
1930 license application for vending second-hand jewelry that asked if 
he had ever been “arrested” for a crime.
45
 The prosecution thus suggested 
that Michelson was candid only when it served his purposes. 
To further enhance his credibility, Michelson called five character 
witnesses “to prove that he enjoyed a good reputation.”
46
 Apparently, 
they lacked Roosevelt’s standing and talent for bombast. The appellate 
opinions reveal nothing about their identity, background, or calling ex-
cept that two of them had known Michelson for thirty years and others 
“at least half that long.”
47
 The Court further homogenized the character 
witnesses by providing “representative” passages from their testimony. 
Three testified that Michelson’s reputation “for honesty and truthfulness 
and for being a law-abiding citizen” was “good” and “very good.”
48
 Lim-
ited to reputation alone, unlike Colonel Roosevelt in the preceding ex-
ample, they provided no details about Michelson or his reputation. Two 




On cross-examination, the prosecution exploited its latitude to bring 
out specific acts of bad behavior that suggested Michelson’s dishonesty, 
                                                 
 42. Michelson, 165 F.2d at 733–34 (describing the agent’s testimony). 
 43. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 471. 
 44. See J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS & ETHICS 257–58 (2d 
ed. 1993) (discussing “inoculation”). Michelson’s 1927 conviction was admissible under common-
law rules permitting impeachment by prior criminal convictions. See infra text accompanying notes 
99–109. 
 45. See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 471. The Second Circuit’s opinion provides a bit more context. 
By asking about Michelson’s omission, the prosecutor showed that Michelson was not as forthcom-
ing as he professed. See Michelson, 165 F.3d at 735. 
 46. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 471. 
 47. See id. At least one character witness was a woman. Id. at 472 n.3. 
 48. Id. at 471–72. 
 49. Id. at 472. 
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untruthfulness, and “non-law-abiding” conduct.
50
 The prosecutor asked 
four of the character witnesses a stilted question about Michelson’s 1927 
conviction, which Michelson himself had laid before the jury:  
Did you ever hear that Mr. Michelson on March 4, 1927, was con-




Two character witnesses had heard of it and two had not, but the net 
result was that the jury heard about the 1927 conviction four more times. 
Moreover, the question was couched to emphasize Michelson’s willing-
ness to break laws for his own profit. Yet the prime contention in Mi-
chelson was this question, asked of four witnesses:  
Did you ever hear that on October 11th, 1920, the defendant, Solo-
mon Michelson, was arrested for receiving stolen goods?
52
  
“None of the witnesses,” said the Court, “appears to have heard of 
this.”
53
 Put differently, there was no evidence in the trial record of the 
1920 arrest because no witness testified to knowing about it or even hear-
ing of it. Nor does it seem that Michelson himself testified about it.
54
 
Yet the jury heard the question four times, and the trial judge’s in-
structions repeatedly emphasized the allegation while ostensibly educat-
ing the jury about the questions’ limited purpose. The judge gave three 
limiting instructions—two in response to objections and the last during 
the final charge to the jury.
55
 When overruling the first defense objection 
to the 1920 arrest question, the trial judge lectured the jury: 
I instruct the jury what is happening now is this: the defendant has 
called character witnesses and the basis for the evidence given by 
those character witnesses is the reputation of the defendant in the 
community, and since the defendant tenders the issue of his reputa-
tion the prosecution may ask the witness if she has heard of various 
incidents in his career. I say to you that regardless of her answer 
you are not to assume that the incidents asked about actually took 
place. All that is happening is that this witness’ standard of opinion 
of the reputation of the defendant is being tested. Is that clear?
56
 
                                                 
 50. Michelson had apparently offered these traits on his own behalf. 
 51. Id. The Court said that the four witnesses were asked “in substance” the question quoted in 
the text, so the wording may have varied somewhat. 
 52. It is not clear why only four of the five character witnesses were asked this question, nor is 
it clear whether they were the same four queried about Michelson’s 1927 conviction. 
 53. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 472. 
 54. The prosecution had a “paper record” of the arrest, which established its good faith basis 
for asking the question. Defense counsel did not “challenge” the prosecutor’s good faith. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 473 n.3 (quoting the trial judge’s instruction). 
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One suspects the jurors obligingly nodded their heads in assent, yet 
the need for three such instructions only underscores the sophistry at 
work.
57
 In his final charge, the judge again admonished the jury that 
questions about the 1920 arrest served only “to test the standards of char-
acter evidence” and that there was no “proof . . . before you legally with-
in the rules of evidence that this defendant was arrested in 1920 for re-
ceiving stolen goods . . . .” Whatever the niceties of formal evidence, the 
trial judge effectively confirmed Michelson’s 1920 arrest when he in-
structed that the jury should not “hold [it] against him” or “assume what 
the consequences of that arrest were.” Didactically, the judge closed by 
telling the jury to “just drive it from your mind so far as the defendant 
[Michelson] is concerned, and take it into consideration only in weighing 
the evidence of the character witnesses.”
58
  
The jury convicted Michelson, but did it heed the judge’s instruc-
tions? The court of appeals was under no such illusion. Declaring that 
“the jury almost surely cannot comprehend the judge’s limiting instruc-
tion” that purportedly distinguished “between rumors of such conduct as 
affecting reputation, and the fact of it,” the Second Circuit asked the Su-
preme Court to restrict such cross-examination at least to “offenses simi-
lar to those for which the defendant is on trial.”
59
 Prosecutors had ex-
ploited the rules “for purposes of injuring by indirection a character 
which they are forbidden directly to attack in that way.”
60 
The Supreme Court refused to modify the common law rules of 
character evidence at issue in Michelson. Although famous for Justice 
Jackson’s didactic tour of this “grotesque structure,”
61
 Michelson stands 
as a vivid example of how able trial lawyers exploit sophistic rules. The 
case turned on Michelson’s word against that of the revenue agent. If 
Michelson’s hope was to portray himself as a person worthy of belief or, 
at minimum, a person who did not merit conviction, the trial record 
nonetheless cast him in an oily, disreputable light. He offered evidence 
of his honesty, truthfulness, and law-abidedness, yet the jury heard five 
references to the 1927 conviction and seven references, counting jury 
                                                 
 57. The defense’s second objection, also overruled, prompted a second instruction that the 
judge delivered extemporaneously, intending a colloquy of sorts with the jury. The judge asked 
jurors if they understood that “nothing” proved the 1920 arrest; rather, witnesses were only being 
asked if they had “heard of that.” Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 473 n.4 (quoting the Second Circuit). The Second Circuit had further observed that 
cross-examiners do not care that their questions are answered “negatively,” as the whole point is 
“covert insinuation” of the unproven bad act. Id.; see also United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 
735 n.8 (2d Cir. 1948) 
 60. Michelson, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). 
 61. Id. 
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instructions, to the 1920 arrest.
62
 Still, it was Michelson who elected to 
proffer his good character in the first place. When Michelson opened the 
door, the prosecution obligingly pelted his character with rotten eggs. 
Simply put, Michelson had no Theodore Roosevelt to stand between him 
and the Government as a protector. 
C. “Quixotic” Rules and Backdoor Character 
Did the jury understand and follow the judge’s abstruse lecture on 
character evidence in Michelson? Cases and commentators say no, yet 
the law nonetheless assumes the jury did so with perfect comprehension 
and unquestioning fidelity.
63
 This next episode casts even more doubt on 
the law’s complacent assumptions, illustrating that juries will look for 
character regardless of whether formal character proof is offered. In its 
absence, the jury will use whatever clues about character that may be 
available, just as lay people do in everyday life. 
In 1998 Randolph Cuffee was stabbed to death in his New York 
City apartment. Police quickly arrested Monte Milcray, who initially de-
nied any involvement before admitting that he had stabbed Cuffee to 
death, supposedly in self-defense. In his revised story, Milcray claimed 
he mistook the male Cuffee for a female prostitute who had invited 
Milcray to her apartment. Once there, Cuffee attempted to sexually as-
sault Milcray. The two struggled, and Milcray stabbed Cuffee numerous 
times. Milcray fled the apartment, leaving Cuffee to die. At trial, the jury 
acquitted Milcray of homicide. The jury, it appears, was not convinced of 
Milcray’s innocence or his credibility; rather, it found that the State had 
not disproved Milcray’s self-defense claims beyond a reasonable doubt.
64
 
The jury foreperson was D. Graham Burnett, whose book A Trial 
by Jury insightfully looks at problems of proof and jury deliberations in a 
criminal trial.
65
 Burnett, an academic skilled in finding historical truth, 
specializes in the history of science at Princeton University. Burnett rev-
els in the messiness of the factual record and the competing, sometimes 
                                                 
 62. The five references to the 1927 conviction include Michelson’s direct examination plus the 
four cross-examinations of his character witnesses. As for the 1920 arrest, four of his character wit-
nesses were also cross-examined about this event, but more damage was probably done by the 
judge’s three instructions. 
 63. See infra text accompanying notes 119–120, 128. 
 64. D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 165 (2001). 
 65. Id. Burnett stood behind the verdict. See D. Graham Burnett, A Juror’s Role, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (July 1, 2009), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2009/07/2009 
0706171428ebyessedo9.407771e-02.html#axzz2cjpCsIX8. For reviews see e.g., Carl T. Bogus, A 
Verdict on the System, THE NATION, Nov. 21, 2001; Jeffrey Rosen, A Room with a View, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/room-view. 
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inconsistent inferences that one can reasonably draw from the evidence.
66
 
On display throughout the book is Burnett’s determination to uncover the 
historical truth behind the homicide.
67
 An acute observer, he kept a jour-
nal of the trial, including the jury’s three days of deliberations.
68
 During 
those long, sometimes heated discussions, Burnett wrestles with his aca-
demic penchant to keep “the question open,” to conduct jury delibera-
tions as a seminar that risked “transform[ing] the actual trial of the veri-
table Monte Virginia Milcray—a thing with serious tooth in several peo-
ple’s lives—into but a bunch of words.”
69
 In the end, however, the jury’s 
acquittal reflected its sensitivity to both the prosecution’s burden of proof 
and the trial system’s need for a final decision. Trials are not seminars. 
Milcray’s jury worked hard to understand the tangled facts as best it 
could, eschewing “shortcuts, no matter how obvious they seem,” in favor 
of the “long route.”
70
 
Throughout A Trial by Jury, Burnett fulminates about the fictions 
and awkwardness by which the trial process purports to educate the jury 
about the “facts” of the case. Particularly offensive and unhelpful are the 
law’s restrictions on character evidence. The paucity of information 
about the main actors, Cuffee and Milcray, exasperated Burnett:  
From the start of the trial, this careful court practice—separating the 
admissible ‘facts’ of the case from inadmissible information about 




Who was Milcray? “That was the inescapable question. Was he a person 
whose account I could believe?” Had Milcray “been arrested a half a 
dozen times for shaking down gay men in the West Village?” The jury 
found it “infuriating[]” that it would hear such evidence—so they 
thought—only if Milcray testified.
 
Jurors held similar questions about the 
victim, Cuffee. “Who was he?”:  
                                                 
 66. For Burnett’s background, see D. Graham Burnett, PRINCETON U.,  
http://www.princeton.edu/history/people/display_person.xml?netid=dburnett#profile (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2013).  
 67. One other juror was also an academic historian. See BURNETT, supra note 64, at 16. 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 128. The jury struggled very hard to get at the truth. Id. at 112 (recounting 
the jurors’ attempt to reenact the fatal fight between Milcray and Cuffee). 
 69. Id. at 158. 
 70. Id. at 61–62. Burnett colorfully describes this as the jury’s preference for “Ockham’s knit-
ting needles” over “Ockham’s cold razor.” Where the razor “cut[s] out everything but the neces-
sary,” the knitting needles were a very different “epistemological tool, more labor-intensive, more 
creative, better able to work with those tangles.” Id. at 61. 
 71.  Id. at 70. 
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We were being asked to believe that he resorted to physical violence 




“Information bearing directly on this question,” observed Burnett, “was 
essentially prohibited to us, by law.”
73
 Blissfully unaware of the law’s 
many rationalizations for the character prohibition, not to mention the 
rule’s relative youth, Burnett eloquently lambastes it as “counterintui-
tive” from both the perspective of everyday common sense and historical 
methodology: 
Somehow, in the history of jurisprudence, these issues—who people 
were, what they had done in the past—had come to be thought of as 
different in kind from the “facts” of a case, different from blood on 
the wall and reams of phone-company records. How had this idea 
gotten going, when it is was so counterintuitive? I was being asked 
to decide if a crime had occurred—in other words, if someone did 




Apparently, the defense did not call character witnesses or other-
wise make formal use of character proof. Milcray testified to his scant 
criminal record, providing some background about his personal history—
education, employment, family, etc.
75
 On cross-examination, the prose-
cutor ineffectually attacked Milcray with an innocuous fib he had told a 
Marine Corp recruiter about a shoulder injury. Ostensibly, prior lies and 
deceitful conduct are relevant to a witness’s credibility, yet lay jurors 
predictably use them to draw broader inferences about the “type” of per-
son. And it is here that demeanor—the person’s presentation—is also 
used to gauge a person, particularly in the absence of additional “back-
ground.” In Burnett’s rendering, Milcray appeared “benign”; a “mild-
mannered person—one with no history of violent crime . . . .”
76
 As for 
Cuffee, the jury learned he was likely involved in “pimping” male es-
                                                 
 72. Id. at 71. (internal quotation marks omitted). Burnett’s criticisms about character evidence 
are targeted more at the law’s disdain for common sense reasoning than an academic preference for 
some reified historical method. For more information on his reference to cultural studies, including 
“Queer Theory,” see id. at 56–57. 
 73. Id. at 71. 
 74. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 75. Id. at 71–72 (although noting that Milcray had been involved in a “nonviolent [sic] rob-
bery” in his early teen years).  
 76. Id. at 72. Demeanor seems central to the finding that Milcray was “apparently so benign – 
young and slight, well spoken with a handsome dark face.” Id. at 73–74. Asserting that “[t]he prose-
cution’s three key witnesses did test one’s intuitive sense of such things, each presenting a different 
riff on sexual nonconformity,” Burnett carefully describes the demeanor of these cross-dressers, who 
testified that Milcray and Cuffee had been “lovers” for some time. Id. at 51–52. 
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corts but little else about his life.
77
 More salient, because of Cuffee’s 
death, the jury could not use his demeanor as some measure of the man 
and as some clue to what may have occurred. 
What role did such character proof play in the verdict? It is hard to 
know. The jury studiously noted the many inconsistencies and contradic-
tions among the prosecution’s witnesses and was particularly troubled by 
the absence of any motive.
78
 The defense fared little better; Milcray’s 
credibility had also been shredded. The prosecution, however, bore the 
burden of disproving the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Credibility merged imperceptibly into a broader assessment of “who” 
these people were, as best the jury could determine. For both Milcray and 
Cuffee, the question was the same: Was he a person of whom such a 
thing could be thought? 
The weight given character evidence—at trial and in everyday 
life—is illustrated by an incident just hours after the jury acquitted 
Milcray. A fellow juror excitedly called Burnett at home with news she 
had just learned from Milcray’s lawyer. Prior to trial, the defense discov-
ered a “complaint by a young man who alleged that Cuffee molested 
him.” Specifically, this other “young man alleged Cuffee enticed him to 
the apartment by posing as a woman and soliciting sex.” The judge in 
Milcray’s case, however, refused to admit the evidence because the al-
leged victim later refused to prosecute, and the incident itself was 
deemed “more prejudicial than probative.”
79
 Burnett dramatically records 
that this news left him emotionally overwhelmed: “‘Oh God,’ I mumbled 
into the phone, my eyes closed tight, the space inside my head large, diz-
zying. ‘Oh my God . . . .’”
80
 
Weeks later Burnett more calmly reflected on the “power” of this 
evidence. He wondered whether it was “real”; had Cuffee attacked this 
other young man? Moreover, even if true, this alleged other attack “ran-
somed our verdict only by bankrupting its logic.” The jury had not be-
lieved Milcray’s account of the attack, rather, the government failed to 
persuade it of Milcray’s guilt.
81
 
Burnett, the historian and juror, is in good company when he blasts 
the prohibition of character evidence as “counterintuitive” as well as 
“quixotic” and even “perverse.” Yet the larger lesson of A Trial by Jury 
is how shallow and futile the rule is. Character estimations loom large in 
our daily “factfinding” outside the courthouse, and predictably, juries 
                                                 
 77. Id. at 60. 
 78. Id. at 59–60, 73. 
 79. Id. at 175–76. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 179–80. 
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crave such information in the courtroom as well. The expectation of such 
proof cannot be turned off like a light switch. Absent formal character 
proof, the factfinder will fill in the gaps with whatever is more readily 
available, especially demeanor.
82
 The emotional wallop packed by 
Cuffee’s alleged assault against another young man is, of course, a good 
reminder of why the legal system treats such proof so gingerly, but the 
anecdote also teaches that lay factfinders expect to hear such things and 
will draw character portraits with or without it. Moreover, Burnett also 
exposes the law’s self-delusion that evidence may be used (and effective-
ly restricted) for limited purposes. Evidence of past criminal convictions, 
for example, is routinely admitted as relevant to a witness’s credibility on 
the theory that it sheds light on one’s “character for truthfulness,” yet 
juries will understandably use it more broadly and irrespective of nice 





* * * 
 
In these three cases, we see character as something commonplace, 
peculiarly lay in nature. Roosevelt spoke of men of “ability, discipline, 
and integrity.” Michelson’s witnesses asserted he was honest, truthful, 
and law-abiding. Burnett saw Milcray as “benign” and “even tempered.” 
These impressions are not the stuff of psychology; rather, they are the 
lingua franca drawn from daily life. Character is undefined by law be-
cause it is constructed from social relationships, varying in time and 
among communities, and expressed in diverse vernaculars. The law’s 
attempts to cabin it are, as Burnett trenchantly observes, quixotic and 
perverse. 
III. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND MODERN DOCTRINE 
Modern evidence law largely tracks the doctrine laid down by nine-
teenth-century common law. As we will see, the social and cultural un-
derpinnings that supported the common-law rules have changed, perhaps 
significantly enough to warrant reconsideration. This section surveys 
those modern rules relating to character proof, with special focus on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FREs), which the majority of states follow. It 
provides the framework for Part IV, discussing how character proof and 
the modern trial evolved over the last several hundred years. 
                                                 
 82. See infra Part III.C.4. 
 83. See James W. McElhaney, Character Studies: What Jurors Think of Parties Is a Factor in 
Deciding the Case, ABA JOURNAL, Mar. 2001, at 72. 
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A. The Concept of Character Under Modern Rules 
Character evidence remains a core construct under modern evi-
dence law, but one that is deliberately left amorphous. Suppressing all 
creative impulses, the FRE’s drafters adopted the common-law approach 
to character evidence, best seen in Michelson, with only a few tweaks. 
They left the critical term “character” undefined, as had the common 
law.
84
 The belief, or hope, seemed to be that there existed a consensus, 
popular and professional, as to what character meant; a terse definition 
was not needed or, perhaps, risked creating confusion. And while the 
structure may be “grotesque,” the common law rules formed a roof that 




The problem, as we will see, is that when the FREs were adopted in 
the 1970s, any such consensus was already fraying, if not dissolving 
quickly.
86
 Complicating matters, the rules followed the common law by 
making “character,” however defined, the pivot point for admissibility.
87
 
Yet such rules are unwieldy, if not unworkable, without a meaningful 
understanding of “character” in the first place. Bluntly stated, what does 
it mean if we say that evidence may be used to prove X but not Y when 
we have no good idea what Y is? Similarly, evidence of a person’s habit 
was freely admissible to prove a person’s propensity for certain conduct, 
yet this too turns on our ability to distinguish “habit” (admissible)—
which was also left undefined—from “character” (inadmissible). 
The drafters apparently omitted definitions of “character” or, for 
that matter, “habit” because they thought everyone largely understood 
what those terms meant. Rule 404(a)(2) off-handedly references a char-
acter trait for “peacefulness,” and Rule 608 speaks of a witness’s “char-
acter for truthfulness,” but these sparse examples are all that we have. 
The advisory committee’s notes are similarly laconic yet also seem com-
fortably confident that a definitional consensus existed. Relying on 
Charles McCormick’s influential handbook—dating back to the early 
1950s—the advisory committee saw the prime challenge as distinguish-
ing habit from character, not so much plumbing the meaning of character 
itself: 
Character and habit are close akin. Character is a generalized de-
scription of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition in respect to a 
                                                 
 84. See FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404 has been amended several times since it was adopted in 
the mid-1970s; none of the changes addressed the definition of character. 
 85. See infra text accompanying notes 280–296.  
 86. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 87. For example, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts (“other acts” evidence) was admis-
sible to prove any relevant proposition other than character and conduct in conformity therewith. 
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general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. ‘Habit,’ 
in modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more specific. It de-
scribes one’s regular response to a repeated specific situation. If we 
speak of character for care, we think of the person’s tendency to act 
prudently in all the varying situations of life, in business, family 
life, in handling automobiles and in walking across the street. A 
habit, on the other hand, is the person’s regular practice of meeting 
a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as 
the habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time, or 
of giving the hand-signal for a left turn, or of alighting from railway 




The advisory committee further quoted McCormick’s cryptic ob-
servation that “[c]haracter may be thought of as the sum of one’s habits 
though doubtless it is more than this.”
89
 Crucially, how much “more” 
was not explained. Rather, the advisory committee spoke matter-of-factly 
about character traits for “chastity,” “competency” as a driver, “vio-
lence,” and “honesty,” and even contrasted one’s “good” and “bad” char-
acter, all without defining character. Doubts and concerns about charac-
ter evidence centered on the evidence’s relevance and probative value, 
not on the conceptual integrity of “character” itself. Foreshadowing later 
developments, however, the advisory committee adverted to “expanding 
concepts of ‘character,’ which seem of necessity to extend into such are-
as as psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing.” The develop-
ments plainly troubled the committee, which rejected them.
90
 
In sum, the advisory committee approached character as a common-
ly understood concept in no need of a precise, technical definition: Char-
acter was “the kind of person one is.”
91
 It was a lay term; it did not draw 
                                                 
 88. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee’s note (1972) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 162, at 340 (1954)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note (1972) (proponents of psychological test-
ing failed to meet their “burden of persuasion”). In justifying its decision to permit proof of character 
by lay opinion as well as reputation testimony, the committee underscored the commonplace of 
character, describing it as “the kind of person one is”: 
Traditionally character has been regarded primarily in moral overtones of good and bad: 
chaste, peaceable, truthful, honest. Nevertheless, on occasion nonmoral considerations 
crop up, as in the case of the incompetent driver, and this seems bound to happen increas-
ingly. If character is defined as the kind of person one is, then account must be taken of 
varying ways of arriving at the estimate. These may range from the opinion of the em-
ployer who has found the man honest to the opinion of the psychiatrist based upon exam-
ination and testing. No effective dividing line exists between character and mental ca-
pacity, and the latter traditionally has been provable by opinion. 
Id. As we will see, later critics blasted the advisory committee’s failure to embrace modern psychol-
ogy. See generally Lawson, infra note 312. 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note (1972). 
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from psychiatry or psychology (except for determinations of “mental 
capacity”).
92
 Rather, it rested on prevailing social and cultural assump-
tions. 
B. Character and the Propensity Rule 
Quixotic though it may be, the FREs regulate character evidence, as 
had the common law, by essentially limiting its use. Later amendments 
chipped at the edges, yet made no substantial changes except for Rules 
413–415, which are limited to sex offense litigation. A brief overview of 
the current rules reveals the ambiguities and tensions inherent in charac-
ter evidence. 
Rule 404(a) holds the keys to character evidence. A person’s char-
acter, or a trait of character, “is not admissible to prove that on a particu-
lar occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”
93
 
In some relatively rare instances, character is a substantive issue in the 
lawsuit, and thus, proof of character must be offered.
94
 For example, evi-
dence that A is a “bad driver” may be admissible on a claim of negligent 
entrustment to prove that X should not have let A—the “bad driver”—
use his car, but it may not be used to prove that A drove badly and 
caused the accident. 
The general ban on using a person’s character to prove conduct in 
conformity is subject to three exceptions, two of which apply only in 
criminal prosecutions. First, a criminal defendant may elect to offer proof 
of his “good” character to prove he did not commit the crime or is other-
wise unworthy of conviction, which is the role played by Roosevelt in 
the Glover case and the character witnesses called in Michelson.
95
 Sec-
ond, the criminal defendant may elect to prove a crime victim’s “bad” 
character when pertinent to prove the victim’s actions in conformity with 
that trait.
96
 As later amended, Rule 404 raises the stakes for a defendant 
who elects to attack a victim’s character trait: the prosecution may attack 
the very same trait of the defendant.
97
 
                                                 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 86–90. 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The rule was re-styled in 2011 with no substantive change intended. 
Left unexamined is any distinction between “character” and a “trait.” 
 94. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note (1972) (discussing “‘character in 
issue’”). 
 95. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). Naturally, the defendant will portray himself in a positive 
light. 
 96. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B). Naturally, the defendant will have little good to say about the 
victim. 
 97. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). The policy rationale is explained in Rule 404 advisory com-
mittee’s note (2000 amendment) (“[T]he amendment is designed to permit a more balanced presen-
tation of character evidence when an accused chooses to attack the character of the alleged victim.”). 
Character also rears its head in self-defense cases. See Christopher W. Behan, When Turnabout Is 
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When character is admissible under the first two propensity excep-
tions and, more rarely, where character is “at issue,” Rule 405 governs 
the methods of proof. Character witnesses may testify to the subject’s 
reputation in the community or their lay opinion about the subject if 
based on sufficient personal knowledge. Specific instances of conduct 
are tightly controlled because “[they] possess[] the greatest capacity to 
arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.”
98
 The 
proponent of character proof (the direct examiner) may offer specific 
instances only when character is a substantive issue in the lawsuit. Oth-
erwise, only the cross-examiner may inquire about them when testing 
witnesses who offer reputation testimony or their personal opinion. 
The third exception applies in both civil and criminal litigation. It 
posits that all witnesses possess something called a “character for truth-
fulness” which may be attacked or supported in ways regulated by Rule 
608 and Rule 609. In theory, the evidence is relevant only to credibility 
and specifically whether that witness is lying.
99
 The evidence takes three 
different forms which are, in turn, treated differently under the rules: 
character witnesses, specific instances of untruthful conduct, and prior 
criminal convictions. 
Character witnesses may testify that in their opinion or by reputa-
tion among persons in a community, that some other witness has an un-
truthful character. Rule 608 is, however, curiously unbalanced. Attacks 
on a witnesses’ untruthful character may be made as a matter of course; 
evidence law privileges the negative. On the positive side, proof that a 
witness has a “truthful” character may be made only after he or she has 
been attacked as an untruthful person.
100
 The doctrinal assumption is that 
all witnesses possess the modicum of truthful character demanded by the 
law. Finally, it must be stressed that the impeaching attack must narrow-
ly center on the amorphous trait of “truthful” character—it is not suffi-




A prime way of attacking a witness’s truthful character is by asking 
about specific instances of untruthful conduct. Rule 608 provides that 
any witness may be questioned about specific instances of untruths, such 
                                                                                                             
Fair Play: Character Evidence and Self-Defense in Homicide and Assault Cases, 86 OR. L. REV. 
733 (2007). 
 98. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note (1972). 
 99. A witness is credible if her testimony is correct. It may be incorrect because she is lying or 
honestly mistaken. 
 100. FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
 101. This is clearly stated in the current version of FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (revision effective 
Dec. 1, 2011). 
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as lying on an employment application.
102
 Recall that the prosecutor in 
Michelson cross-examined the defendant about his deliberate failure to 
disclose a prior criminal conviction on a license application.
103
 How is 
this relevant? In theory, if the witness lied before, he’s more likely to lie 
when testifying. Of course, proof that any witness, or any human being 
for that matter, has at some point lied before is hardly newsworthy.
104
 
The jury in Milcray’s murder prosecution was seemingly unimpressed 
that Milcray had fibbed about a prior injury when enlisting in the mili-
tary.
105
 Perhaps recognizing the frailty of this sort of proof, the law of 
evidence allows any witness to be cross-examined about specific in-
stances of untruthful conduct while also forbidding proof of the instances 
by extrinsic evidence (i.e., other witnesses).
106
 Put differently, the cross-
examiner must accept the witness’s answer: If the witness denies the 
specific instance, the cross-examiner cannot call another person who will 
contradict the witness’s answer. 
The law of evidence also permits the use of prior criminal convic-
tions to prove a witness’s untruthful character. This technically complex 
form of evidence varies by jurisdiction. Some courts permit disclosure of 
the offense (e.g., manslaughter), the date, the sentence, and occasionally 
details of the crime, as is authorized by Rule 609.
107
 Other courts restrict 
proof to the “mere fact” and number of convictions.
108
 Regardless of 
form, the idea is that prior criminal convictions indicate a disregard for 
the truth and a willingness to lie when convenient, even under oath. As 
with so much of evidence law, there is no empirical basis for such as-
sumptions, nor is it grounded in psychological theory. Rather, the prac-
tice arose in a Victorian social and cultural setting that prized good char-
acter and equated a criminal record with a bad character. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, writing in the late nineteenth century, colorfully and 
                                                 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Character witnesses may also be questioned about the subject wit-
ness’s lapses in truthfulness. 
 103. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 104. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.) (“Which 
of us has never lied?”). 
 105. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Milcray’s fib had little effect on the jury, per-
haps because it had already heard far more compelling evidence that Milcray was lying anyway, 
especially his blatantly inconsistent statements to police. In the final analysis the jury decided that 
the prosecution failed in its burden of proof regardless of Milcray’s lies. 
 106. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The cross-examiner must have a good faith basis for inquiring into 
a specific instance. Extrinsic evidence of such conduct is inadmissible regardless of how brazenly 
the witness may deny it. 
 107. FED. R. EVID. 609. See 4 MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609:3 
(7th ed. 2012). 
 108. 4 M. GRAHAM, supra note 107, § 609:6, at 573. 
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quaintly identified a convicted criminal’s “readiness to do evil,” includ-
ing lying in court, as the rule’s justification.
109
 
C. Evading the Propensity Rule 
Rule 404(a) precludes the use of character as circumstantial evi-
dence of conduct, yet the ban is honored only in the breach: The rule is 
subject to sundry broad exceptions and distinctions that collectively al-
low wholesale evasions. Such breaches are facilitated by various rules of 
limited admissibility that foster chimerical distinctions among eviden-
tiary uses and further blur the meaning of character itself. For canny trial 
lawyers, the propensity rule is largely an exercise in evasion. 
In this section, we will examine two rules that are officially-
sanctioned exceptions to the character/propensity ban, namely, “other 
act” evidence and Rules 413–415. Still further-reaching and ultimately 
more corrosive than these exceptions are long-standing approaches to 
“background” and “demeanor” that amount to “stealth” character proof, 
despite all denials to the contrary. 
1. “Other Act” Evidence 
Ever since the law banned character evidence in the nineteenth cen-
tury, courts have permitted proof of “other acts” when relevant to some-
thing other than character and propensity.
110
 Unsurprisingly, the rule 
sparked doctrinal battles from the start and remains the most litigated 
issue in modern evidence law.
111
 This litigiousness bears witness to both 
the fuzziness and power of character evidence. 
Rule 404(b) embodies the doctrine’s modern form. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the subject’s 
character for purposes of showing that he acted in accordance with “the 
character” on a particular occasion. The evidence may, however, be used 
to prove other propositions, such as motive, opportunity, preparation, 
plan, identity, and the like.
112
 The rule represents the so-called inclusion-
ary approach: The other act is admissible so long as it is relevant to any 
proposition other than character or propensity.
113
 In theory, the inclu-
sionary approach spares the proponent having to jam evidence into a 
short list of prescribed uses, as demanded by the alternative “exclusion-
                                                 
 109. Gertz. v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (Holmes, J.). 
 110. See Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. 
REV. 988, 1001–02 (1937–38). 
 111. E.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rules Revisited, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1547, 1556 (1998). 
 112. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 113. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 190, 196–200 (Kenneth S. Broun, ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
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ary” approach.
114
 Other act evidence is used in criminal and civil cases 
by both sides.
115
 In Milcray’s prosecution, for example, we saw that the 
defense unsuccessfully offered evidence that the victim, Cuffee, had al-




When the other act proof offered under 404(b) packs considerable 
probative wallop, such as a prior similar crime by a criminal defendant or 
similar accidents in a civil case, the proponent has considerable incentive 
to search out an ostensibly permissible purpose—and the search is not 
that difficult. Counsel’s ingenuity, coupled with the rule’s elasticity, pro-
duces readily available theories of admissibility. Admissibility is entrust-




Two problems quickly become apparent when other act evidence is 
admitted. First, limited admissibility requires faith in the efficacy of lim-
iting instructions. Yet skepticism regarding limiting instructions is well-
placed. Over sixty years ago, the Michelson Court commented on the 
general limpness of limiting instructions, a critique that has continued 
and deepened in the decades that followed.
118
 Second and related, the 
problem is especially acute with other act evidence, which is conceived 
as a binary problem: The evidence may be used for a permissible purpose 
(e.g., motive) but not as proof of character/propensity. Yet because other 
act evidence is relevant to both propositions, juries naturally look to both 
despite their best efforts to heed a judge’s instruction. Further, inferences 
from conduct to character are often more alluring than those to puzzling-
ly narrow legal constructs like intent and are nearly inevitable when there 
is no discernible distinction between permissible and impermissible uses, 
such as other acts to prove identity.
119
 
In sum, lawyers are highly motivated to put other act proof before 
the jury under nearly any pretext. Whatever the law may think of it, the 
propensity inference is alluring and familiar to lay jurors, carrying con-
siderable probative value regardless of limiting instructions. Juries crave 
the context provided by character proof, as historian Burnett observed. 
They will use other act evidence in the courtroom in much the same way 
                                                 
 114. Although scholars have made much of the distinction between the exclusionary and inclu-
sionary approaches, it is not clear that in practice the difference is all that great. 
 115. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 113, at § 200. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
 117. E.g., United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 118. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1948); see also Melilli, supra note 
111, at 1576 (branding such instructions “preposterous”). 
 119. See, e.g., Miller, 673 F.3d at 694–700 (grappling with other acts offered to prove intent 
and knowledge); see also 3 M. GRAHAM, supra note 107, § 404.5 at 120 (collecting cases). 
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jurors use it in their everyday life. The key is to remember that other acts 
are relevant to both character and the purported “other” purpose; limiting 
instructions are useless. 
2. Sexual Misconduct and Rules 413–415 
For cynics who view the other act rule as a seamy, oblique sell-out 
of the ban against character as proof of propensity, Rules 413 to 415 are 
at least refreshingly candid.
120
 When a defendant is charged with a crime 
of “sexual assault,” Rule 413 admits evidence of the defendant’s com-
mission of other sexual assaults, which “may be considered for its bear-
ing on any matter to which it is relevant.”
121
 This includes the defend-
ant’s “propensity to commit sexual assault or child molestation offenses, 
and assessment of the probability or improbability that the defendant has 
been falsely or mistakenly accused.”
122
 Later cases clarified that admissi-
bility is not mandatory; such evidence remains subject to Rule 403 and 
other rules of evidence, including hearsay rules.
123
 Nonetheless, in argu-
ing in favor of admissibility, the government may use a straightforward 
propensity inference, in contrast to Rule 404(b)’s propensity prohibition. 
Rule 413 is complemented by Rule 414, governing similar crimes 
evidence in “child molestation cases,” and Rule 415, which applies in 
civil cases involving damages claims predicated upon sexual assaults or 
child molestation.
124
 These three rules have been roundly criticized not 
only for eviscerating the ban against character/propensity proof in a nar-
row band of cases but also for resting on flimsy empirical bases. Spon-
sors of legislation supporting the rules, it seems, seized upon psychologi-
cal research that did not fully justify the rules.
125
 
Yet aside from psychological studies, one must grapple with popu-
lar beliefs that certain “types” of people are prone to repeat certain kinds 
of conduct. The belief is manifest in sex offender registries and frequent 
protests over where to house sexual “predators.”
126
 In the Milcray murder 
prosecution, a jury that included two historians wondered whether 
Milcray committed similar violent offenses and thought it silly that the 
                                                 
 120. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the Grotesque Doctrine of Character Evidence: 
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 121. FED. R. EVID. 413(a). 
 122. Statement of Representative Susan Molinari, the legislation’s co-sponsor (quoted in 3 M. 
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law denied them such proof.
127
 Indeed, the popular allure of such proof 
means that it is usually proffered under Rule 404(b) in jurisdictions that 
lack more direct doctrinal exceptions like Rules 413 to 415.
128
 
3. “Background” of a Witness: Character-“Lite” 
By convention, courts routinely allow testimony about a witness’s 
“background.” When a witness is called to the stand, the direct examiner 
customarily asks the witness’s name and then elicits some contextual 
information about who—literally—the witness is. This often includes 
age, education, occupation, service in the armed forces, family life, and 
assorted homely tidbits. Such testimony accomplishes two things. First, it 
usually relaxes the witness by allowing him or her to talk about uncon-
tested facts that are comfortable and familiar. Second, it gives the trier of 
fact some idea about the person on the stand. 
In theory, at least, such background stands apart from character, 
which is inadmissible unless it falls within the narrowly tailored excep-
tions in Rule 404(a). Law school textbooks feature problems designed to 
distinguish admissible witness “background” from inadmissible “charac-
ter.”
129
 The distinction, while well recognized in law, is illusory. Back-
ground may be better thought of as “character-lite.” The whole point is to 
provide a snapshot of the kind of person the witness is. A leading trial 
advocacy text emphasizes the importance of background when jurors ask 
the critical question, “Can I believe him?”: 
Witnesses who lead responsible stable lives; who are members of 
the community; who have resided in it for a substantial period; and 
who have served their community or country are more believable. 
Such witnesses meet jurors’ comfort level because they are “just 
like us.” Common background information usually includes resi-




“Jurors,” we are told, “want to know if the witness is a reliable member 
of the community or society and has attained notable goals, worked hard, 
                                                 
 127. BURNETT, supra note 64, at 70–71. Several jurors, including Burnett, later took cold com-
fort in learning that the victim may have assaulted another young man on another occasion. 
 128. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 113, at § 190 (“Unlike the other purposes 
for other-crimes evidence, the sex crimes exception flaunts the general prohibition of evidence 
whose only purpose is to invite the inference that a defendant who committed a previous crime is 
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 129. E.g., CARLSON ET AL., supra note 39, at 356–57. 
 130. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIALS 125 (2d ed. 2009). 
114 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:87 
and overcome adversity along the way. Those are the people we admire, 
and the ones we believe when they become witnesses during trial.”
131
 
Background, then, is character evidence by another name, and by 
permitting specifics about a person’s education, life story, etc., evidence 
law provides the trier of fact with more detail than the dry reputation and 
opinion testimony of character witnesses. It is essential. When the wit-
ness is also a party to the lawsuit or the prosecution, his or her back-
ground may go beyond credibility and provide clues (via propensity) as 
to factual issues.
132
 Missing from the testimony are the value-laden 
nouns—honest, hardworking, disciplined, good, etc.—by which charac-
ter proof is most often identified, yet as the example of Burnett and his 
fellow jurors teaches, juries quickly, naturally fill in these blanks. Bur-
nett and his fellow jurors needed to know “who people were, what they 
had done in the past.” The accused killer’s unassuming appearance (de-
meanor) plus his lack of any significant criminal record, employment 
history, and personal life raised the image of a “benign” young man.
133
 In 
some, admittedly rare, circumstances, the jury requires no background 
testimony because the person is commonly known, as is true of a Theo-
dore Roosevelt. Yet the Roosevelts—people with celebrity stature—only 
remind us of how powerful background can be. 
In sum, credibility determinations demand that we know something 
about the witness who testifies. The demand is accommodated by the 
simple, arguably devious, device of labeling as “background” what 
would otherwise be impermissible character evidence. The doctrinal ac-
commodation only underscores the futility of the character/propensity 
ban in the first place. 
4. Demeanor: Character and Appearance 
We believe that demeanor is critical to credibility, even if we are 
unsure exactly what to make of it.
134
 The term “demeanor” broadly ap-
plies to a person’s outward appearance, including dress, manner of 
speaking, gestures, and the like. Burnett’s account of Milcray’s trial is 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 126; see also TANFORD, supra note 44, at 256. 
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sprinkled with acute observations of witnesses’ demeanor, especially the 
prosecution’s “gender-bender” witnesses.
135
 Demeanor is most often as-
sociated with witnesses, but the demeanor of lawyers is also important. 
Trial advocacy texts stress proper deportment for lawyers.
136
 Likewise, a 
party’s demeanor, especially that of a criminal defendant, is closely scru-
tinized even when he or she is not testifying. Burnett and his fellow ju-
rors, for example, were sizing up Milcray even before he took the 
stand.
137
 Despite unanimity on the significance of demeanor, venerable 
authority holds that it is not evidence, at least not in the same way as tes-
timony.
138
 Nonetheless, jury instructions often direct juries to consider 
demeanor when assessing credibility.
139
 
Demeanor’s significance, however, extends beyond credibility de-
terminations (Whom do we believe at trial?). As important, it serves also 
as proof of one’s character.
140
 Clothing, manner of speech, physical ap-
pearance, gestures, and the like affect how people are perceived by oth-
ers, as anyone who has ever applied for a job knows well. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s character encomiums, delivered in a sincere, respectful yet 
light-hearted manner by a man whose own towering reputation overawed 
all others, were apparently well received by the jury and the audience. 
Milcray’s demeanor, combined with his “background” testimony, as we 
have seen, led Burnett to conclude he was “benign,” “an apparently mild-
mannered person—one with no history of violent crime.”
141
 
Demeanor is little discussed in the case law largely because the 
written record captures only the words spoken in court and the exhibits 
formally offered as proof, not appearances and impressions that leave no 
traces in the transcript. Yet as Burnett’s account underscores, demeanor 
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IV. CHARACTER PROOF IN HISTORY 
The modern rules reflect the futility of banning character proof. Ex-
ceptions and evasions provide broad avenues around this “quixotic” pro-
scription with the net result that character seeps into trials regardless. 
This section examines the origins of the modern rules and how this dis-
junct emerged between law and popular thinking.
143
 The story is com-
plex, but its outlines are reasonably clear. 
The social and cultural understanding of character has radically 
changed over time. In the eighteenth century, character marked one’s 
place in a hierarchically conceived society that was mostly agrarian and 
pre-industrial. The old-style trial reflected prevailing social values, in-
cluding the centrality of character. The 1800s democratized character for 
a liberal market society and an increasingly industrial urban economy. 
Character now reflected traits deemed helpful, if not essential, for suc-
cess in this very different social and economic order. Yet while the Vic-
torians worshipped character development outside the courtroom, they 
attempted to restrict its use in a newly fashioned vision of the trial as a 
scientific search for historical truth. 
The familiar middle-class values contained in this Victorian con-
struction of character held together well into the twentieth century. Roo-
sevelt’s testimony in the Glover case and Justice Jackson’s discussion in 
Michelson reflect not only these values but also the difficulty of manag-
ing them in the courtroom. Despite the tension, however, law and popu-
lar culture appeared to share an understanding of character. That shared 
understanding, as we will see, has withered since the 1960s. 
A. Character, Deference, and the Old-Style Trial (1700–1800) 
1. Character and the Eighteenth-Century Social Order 
The eighteenth century understood and used character very differ-
ently socially, culturally, and legally than we do today. Trials and charac-
ter reflected the society they served. A brief survey of this period will 
help us better understand why the nineteenth century turned all this on its 
head. 
Of primary significance is the economic and social setting. Eight-
eenth-century North America was an overwhelmingly agricultural, pre-
industrial, and pre-urban society. In the 1770s, the non-Indian population 
of whites and blacks numbered only about two million persons thinly 
scattered along the coast from Georgia to Maine. Philadelphia boasted a 
population of 28,000. Commercial agriculture—tobacco in the South, 
                                                 
 143. See infra Part V.A.  
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wheat in the middle colonies—and trade were prevalent but so was sub-
sistence farming.
144
 Eighteenth-century social assumptions befitted this 
world. Society was organic and ordered. The great Calvinist theologian 
Jonathan Edwards declared that “all have ‘their appointed office, place 
and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every-
one keeps his place, and continues in his proper business.’”
145
 
Historian Gordon Wood observed that this social hierarchy “was 
part of the natural order of things, part of that great chain of existence 
that ordered the entire universe . . . .”
146
 Although the “chain” metaphor 
dominates, the links of this chain were hardly equal. The social structure 
more accurately reflected a pyramid dominated by a wealthy, privileged 
elite at the top with a far broader base of “simple folk” at the bottom.
147
 
Movement among ranks was necessary at times for people to assume 
their proper station, “but such mobile persons had to possess and demon-
strate the qualifications of the rank or positions into which they 
moved.”
148
 Order was sustained through deference and sometimes de-
pendency—the mutual obligations, respect, and courtesy that the various 
ranks owed one another.
149
 
The ranking within this deferential society is well illustrated by the 
oft-told tale of Reverend Devereux Jarratt, the son of a farmer-artisan in 
colonial Virginia. A “periwig,” Jarratt recalled, “was a distinguishing 
badge of the gentle folk” in the 1730s. When as a boy Jarrat “saw a man 
riding the road, near our house, with a wig on, it would so alarm my 
fears . . . that, I dare say, I would run off, as for my life.”
150
 It is unclear 
how many others shared Jarratt’s anxieties, but the story reveals a great 
deal about social expectations based on rank. 
Although North America lacked a landed aristocracy (nobles) of the 
British sort, its ersatz elites nonetheless sought to set themselves above 
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the “common people” by aspiring to gentility, the status of gentlemen.
151
 
Society expected conduct consistent with one’s rank, which took a wide 
variety of forms. Dress served as vivid indicia, as we saw in Jarratt’s 
panicked flight upon spying a wig. Handwriting also revealed social 
standing and even authority. The well-born had long used an “Italian 
hand” to set themselves apart.
152
 Later, homes and furnishings would 
provide still other markers of social standing.
153
 
The demands of deference also dictated how people, especially the 
gentry, were to behave in all walks of life. Keeping one’s word, for ex-
ample, was paramount.
154
 George Washington famously studied the 
proper rules of “civility and decent behavior,” copying a list of 110 pre-
cepts.
155
 As the nation’s first president, Washington selected men of “the 
first characters” to fill important roles in the federal government. By 
choosing Thomas Jefferson as his Secretary of State and Alexander 
Hamilton as the Secretary of the Treasury, Washington drew on their 
impressive abilities and accomplishments, as well as their established 
reputations, to build the federal government’s legitimacy.
156
 
Reputation was, even in the eighteenth century, a means of proving 
character, but it represented something more because “character” was 
“something objectively visible . . . .”
157
 Reputation meant that others in 
the community spoke about the subject’s conduct; to be “talked about” 
was essential. In colonial America, a good reputation served as a badge 
of distinction for those, like Washington, who aspired to the status of 
gentlemen and who were keenly aware that “character was not just who 
you were but also what others thought you were.”
158
 A reputation equat-
ed to one’s honor and was sedulously protected, especially by the gentry, 
sometimes by lawsuits and dueling.
159
 Privacy hardly existed at all in the 
small, localized communities of the eighteenth century: “[P]eople in this 
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society noticed everything . . . .”
160
 Moreover, it was a society predicated 
on face-to-face contact where “one’s good name seems as precious as 
life itself.”
161
 Benjamin Franklin preached the importance of securing 
one’s “Credit and Character as a Tradesman” by being industrious and 
frugal in “Reality” and “by avoiding ‘all Appearances of the Contra-
ry.’”
162
 Letters of introduction served as written testaments to one’s good 
character.
163
 Commercial relationships often turned on one’s reputa-
tion.
164
 In sum, others wanted to know where a person stood in the social 
ordering and, as important, what other people thought of him or her. 
Deference within and across social classes promoted social cohe-
sion by minimizing social friction. Political and legal authority was built 
upon the social authority inherent in this hierarchical worldview.
165
 And 
in eighteenth-century trials, the workings of deference were laid bare. 
2. The Old-Style Trial 
The extent to which deference pervaded day-to-day social relation-
ships is problematic, particularly in North America, but it clearly perme-
ated eighteenth-century politics, law, and, most certainly, trials. Defer-
ence describes a world of face-to-face contact where social rank and rep-
utation carried not just authority but reciprocal rights, obligations, and 
mutual respect, regardless of one’s standing. It promoted social cohesion 
by minimizing social friction. To enhance their legitimacy, law and poli-
tics institutionalized deference in the eighteenth century.
166
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Eighteenth-century trials were conducted viva voce (face-to-face), 
as they are today, but their form and function differed dramatically from 
those of their progeny. Character, as we will see, played a pivotal role. 
Much of what we know about these trials centers on British criminal cas-
es.
167
 The court assumed that the accused was guilty; the accused bore 
the burden of proving their innocence or at least surfacing a reasonable 
doubt.
168
 Trials were conducted largely by judges, who questioned wit-
nesses and summarized evidence and law for the jury. Aptly described as 
a “rambling altercation” between accused and accuser, the old-style trial 
featured no nice distinctions between the prosecution and defense case-
in-chief.
169
 Rules of evidence, including hearsay doctrine, were evolving 
but would not mature until the 1800s.
170
 Lawyers were only beginning to 
appear on behalf of parties, especially defendants. After 1750, trials 
begin to assume a more modern form by which the trial tested the 
strength of the prosecution’s evidence, which now bore the burden of 
proving the charge.
171
 Yet these shifts would take decades to evolve. 
The old-style trial’s essence is perhaps best captured by the speed 
of the proceeding, including the decision-making. Most criminal trials 
lasted just a “few minutes.”
172
 The judges examined the victim and any 
other witnesses; the defendant usually had no lawyer. To enhance the 
pace, juries sometimes heard multiple cases before retiring to deliberate 
on the entire series. When jurors complained of difficulty in keeping the 
evidence straight, judges permitted them to deliberate after each case was 
presented. This led to faster trials because rather than leaving the court-
room, a quick “huddle” among jurors produced a verdict, usually one 
advocated by the foreperson, a seasoned juror. To facilitate this huddle, 
courtrooms were redesigned to feature the jury box, which brought hasti-
ly assembled jurors, previously scattered around the courtroom, into 
close proximity to quickly exchange comments and eye contact.
173
 
The old-style trial, then, was hardly designed for a careful and me-
thodical, not to mention lengthy and expensive, search for historical 
truth. Rather, it promoted efficient decision-making at a time before plea-
bargaining, when judges actively encouraged defendants to take their 
                                                 
 167. See generally J.M. BEATTIE, CRIMES AND THE COURTS OF ENGLAND, 1660–1800 (1986); 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003). 
 168. BEATTIE, supra note 167, at 341. 
 169. See DAVID J. A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL 
TRIAL, 1800–1865, at 30 (1998) (summarizing the secondary literature). 
 170. BEATTIE, supra note 167, at 364. 
 171. Id. at 375. 
 172. Id. at 376. 
 173. Id. at 395–99. The jury’s huddle, which Beattie describes as a “rapid survey” to see if the 
other jurors agreed with the foreman, usually lasted no more than several minutes. Id. at 397. 
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cases to trial and not to plead guilty.
174
 Why? The eighteen-century crim-
inal trial invested vast discretion in judges and juries. Discretion was 
“shot through” this system because guilty verdicts normally meant a 
death sentence, and social harmony and order depended upon the sparing 
use of the hangman’s noose. Put differently, it was imperative that most 
defendants be acquitted and only a few executed. The trial served to 
identify those whose death was not only “just desserts” but was also nec-
essary to deter other offenders.
175
 Punishing every offender for their 
transgressions was never the point. 
As an aid to such discretionary responsibility in a deferential socie-
ty, character played a central role in eighteenth-century criminal trials.
176
 
Juries carefully considered character when deciding guilt and judges 
considered it when sentencing the offender.
177
 Character loomed as im-
portant in eighteenth-century courtrooms as it did when historian Burnett 
and his fellow twenty-first century jurors struggled to learn “who” the 
victim and the accused were: 
Crimes came forward for consideration as the deeds of actual men 
and women who obviously differed hugely; some of them young, 
some old; some apparent first-timers, some clearly experienced; 
some timid, some defiant. The jury and the judge regarded this as 
important information that ought to play a crucial role in their deci-
sions. Who the prisoner was – his character and reputation – was 
as critical a question as what he had done (and even in some cases 
                                                 
 174. See id. at 337, 446. 
 175. Id. at 406, 420–22. 
 176. Id. at 406 (“In the courtroom itself the trial jurors and the judges and magistrates were 
also keenly aware of the character of the prisoner and the prosecutor, and of the wider social needs 
to be served by their verdict and by the penalties that would follow.”). Taking a different view, 
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admits this when he observes that “[b]ecause there was such pressure on defendants to adduce evi-
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rule.” Id. at 196. While some judges warned about character proof, the rule that purportedly banned 
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present in the past, see CAIRNS, supra note 169, at 36 (“[Langbein’s] repeated modern comparisons 
mean the origins of today’s rules of evidence and procedure dominate his analysis, at the expense of 
historical perceptions of the trial. He compounds presentism with moralism, for there is a recurring 
assumption in his work of the inferiority of eighteenth century procedure, which is condemned for 
falling short of the standards of the late twentieth century.” (citation omitted)). 
 177. BEATTIE, supra note 167, at 429 (“The character of the defendant as well as of the offense 
were of prime importance.”). 
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whether he had done it), and it was centrally the business of the tri-
al to find the answer. The discretionary options available to both the 
juries and the judges were exercised with that question and with 
those answers very much in mind.
178
 
Thus, just as vehemently as the modern trial insists that character be 
formally excised from consideration, the old-style trial embraced and 
welcomed various forms of character. “What happened” was inseparably 
blended with the kind of people involved and what others thought of 
them. The old-style trial’s leading historian, J.M. Beattie, observes that 
jurors and judges “paid attention not just to the facts alleged and the de-
fense offered. They were in addition anxious to discover something 
about the men and women on each side.”
179
 Beattie places character at 
the center of trial:  
The character of the prisoner (in the sense of both his disposition 
and his reputation) was especially important information and was 
often crucial to the outcome of the trial.
180
 
For this reason, courts actively “encouraged prisoners to bring 
character witnesses to speak on their behalf” about their “habits of life: 
did he work regularly; did he support his family; was he sober and honest 
in his dealings with others; did he, in other words, have an established 
place in the community, and was he known to his respectable neighbors 
as a man who could be trusted?”
181
 Beattie bluntly concludes that “[a] 
man who could produce no witnesses was likely to have a difficult time 
in court.”
182
 “Disposition” and “reputation,” although different, were 
both important. Proof that the defendant was a good person or that he 
was thought well of in the community might lead to an outright acquittal, 
a conviction on a lesser (noncapital) offense, or the judge’s recommenda-
tion for a king’s pardon.
183
 
Because juries likely knew little, if anything, about the victim or the 
accused, character witnesses were essential, occasionally providing “the 
decisive evidence leading to acquittals.”
184
 Beattie observes that some 
trials “involved as much a weighing up and balancing of the reputation 
and social worth of the principals on each side as of the evidence.”
185
 In 
                                                 
 178. Id. at 436 (emphasis added). For Burnett’s strikingly similar statement about modern 
trials, see supra text accompanying note 74. 
 179. BEATTIE, supra note 167, at 440. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. Conversely, it bode ill for the prisoner if he was a “troublemaker and an idler.” Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 443. 
 184. Id. at 441. 
 185. Id. at 442. 
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one case, the judge called upon the defendant to produce “better charac-
ter witnesses,” not a “better factual defense.”
186
 The more “respectable 
the witnesses, the more effectively the prisoner’s character could be es-
tablished.”
187
 Failing to produce witnesses might prove “disastrous,” as 
defendants well knew when they explained to the court why potential 
witnesses could not appear because of distance or poverty.
188
 Absent 
character witnesses, judges and juries looked to how people dressed, 
spoke, and acted in court; demeanor, then, was a proxy for character.
189
 
In sum, the character of the accused or the victim, both in the sense 
of disposition and reputation, was of “fundamental importance” to juries 
and judges as they exercised their discretion.
190
 Modern evidence law 
fixates on character’s shortcomings as circumstantial evidence of what 
someone did (propensity), but eighteenth-century courts used character 
more expansively. Who was the accused? Was he an “old offender” who 
deserved death? What did the community think of him or her? Was he 
sober and industrious or of an “indifferent character”? Similar questions 
were raised about victims. Although character might shed some light on 
the crime itself, its chief value rested on knowing something of the peo-
ple themselves and helping juries and judges decide who must be pun-
ished for their failings. In this sense, old-style trials elevated character as 
a central element of determining guilt or innocence and, by extension, 
preserving the law’s role in social cohesion.
191
 What is most remarkable 
is how quickly all of this changed in the nineteenth century. 
B. Character, Nineteenth-Century Liberalism, and the Modern Trial 
1. Character and “Self-Culture” 
For Theodore Roosevelt, being called a “gentleman” was the high-
est compliment one could achieve.
192
 Yet the word “gentleman” meant 
something very different to Roosevelt than it did to a twitchy Deveraux 
Jarratt 150 years earlier. The nineteenth century marked a sea change in 
character that reflected remarkable and enduring shifts in the American 
economy, society, politics, and culture. Character was refashioned from 
one’s post in a stratified, stable, and largely agricultural society to one’s 
prospects in a dynamic industrial economy that prized human autonomy, 
                                                 
 186. Id. at 442. The trial’s goal was to identify the “old offenders” who repeatedly violated the 
law. Id. at 443, 445. 
 187. Id. at 447–48. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 443, 447. 
 190. Id. at 449. 
 191. Id. at 448–49. 
 192. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 43. 
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competition among individuals, and individual success. This liberalism 




The American market economy exploded in the nineteenth century, 
dominated by its industrial sector. Wall Street fed the new industrial 
economy’s voracious financial needs while industry’s organizational 
demands triggered the rise of the modern corporation. Commercial agri-
culture remained an economic mainstay, but industrial modernization 
meant more people worked as wage laborers in factories.
194
 The develop-
ing economy catalyzed profound social changes. The population swelled 
from 5.3 million in 1800 to 91.9 million by 1910, creating a huge internal 
market for goods and services. The nation’s ethnic composition also 
changed. After the Civil War, immigrants from southeastern Europe, 
chiefly Italy, Poland, and Russia, blended uneasily with the nation’s 
largely Anglo-Saxon stock. Cities grew in number and size. New York’s 
population consisted of 80% immigrants in 1890. By 1920, more Ameri-
cans lived in urban than rural areas. Increasing numbers of Americans 
worked in factories as unskilled wage labor while others joined the ex-
panding middle class as business managers, doctors, or lawyers. Society 
was more fluid and dynamic than ever before.
195
 People hoped to move 
up the social and economic ladder to improve their prospects. 
Character was turned on its head in this new order. No longer did it 
reflect one’s assigned place in a static social order: “character” now 
summed up one’s prospects for success. Sparks first thrown by the eight-
eenth-century Enlightenment and the Revolution burned brightly in an 
age where self-improvement became the polestar. In politics, too, it was 
the age of the “common man” where, at least for white males, legal bar-
riers to voting and office holding melted away. People themselves select-
ed how high they might rise based on their own talents, capacities, and 
ambition. 
Character was transformed from an innate attribute, like hair color, 
to a set of standards to which one aspired. The subject is complex, but 
some generalizations are helpful.
196
 “Common folk, doomed since the 
dawn of time to a life of brutish toil, could be schooled to a new plane of 
usefulness and happiness.”
197
 Prisons were designed to reform criminals’ 
                                                 
 193. Like character, liberalism has changed over time. See Gary Gerstle, The Protean Charac-
ter of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1043, 1045 (1994). 
 194. See BRINKLEY, UNFINISHED NATION, supra note 144, at ch. 17. 
 195. See id. at ch. 18. 
 196. DANIEL FELLER, THE JACKSONIAN PROMISE 78, 138 (1995); Daniel Walker Howe, Victo-
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deficient characters.
198
 Schools, labor groups, churches, and insane asy-
lums, for example, adopted an “environmentalist approach to character” 
that “wanted literally to re-form people.”
199
 Business dealings turned on 




Character formation assumed some urgency in an open society that 
celebrated enlightened self-interest; the challenge then, as now, was to 
balance one’s individual cravings, especially for material success, with 
the public good.
201
 In such a society, “self-discipline was the crucial cata-
lyst of improvement—the key to reaching responsible citizenship, finan-
cial security, social respectability, mental and moral fulfillment, and thus 
true happiness.”
202
 For example, Horatio Alger’s book Ragged Dick cel-
ebrated ascent through hard work, education, discipline, and a little 
luck.
203
 The main character, Ragged Dick, went from being a boot black 
to a good job in a counting house because he learned how to read, do 
arithmetic, write legibly, pronounce words correctly, and dress for the 
business world.
204
 In elevating one’s character, one assumed the trap-
pings of the polite (gentle) culture that literally characterized the emer-
gent middle class.
205
 By the late nineteenth-century a host of character-
building institutions, such as the YMCA and the Boy Scouts, stressed 
traits that equipped a person for individual success yet also taught re-
sponsibility and selflessness.
206
 And if such organizations catered to 
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whites, Booker T. Washington preached the same message of “high 
character” to blacks in the 1890s.
207
 
Historian Paul Boyer has skillfully shown how various charity or-
ganizations during the Gilded Age, including settlement houses, worked 
to reform the character of the urban poor, particularly the new immi-
grants from southern and eastern Europe who flooded the nation’s cities. 
The “charity organization movement,” according to Boyer, assumed that 
“the roots of urban poverty lay in the moral deficiencies and character 
flaws of the poor”; the eradication of slums could not occur unless the 
poor corrected these “deficiencies.”
208
 However, the slums remained. 
Personal flaws, charity workers came to see, were not always the “root” 
cause of grinding poverty, as the horrific Depression of 1893 demon-
strated, yet they seemed to be symptomatic nonetheless. Charity organi-
zations then shifted their focus to environmental factors, both moral and 
industrial, in the hope of reforming slum-dwellers.
209
 
Nineteenth-century intellectuals articulated an ideology of self-
improvement or, more aptly, “self-cultivation” that both reflected and 
served the new social, cultural, and economic reality.
210
 Personal auton-
omy became an imperative while Scottish commonsense thinking, along 
with faculty psychology, assisted the “adaptation to commercial val-
ues.”
211
 “Victorian character formation,” according to historian Daniel 
Walker Howe, grew from evangelical religion and the older tradition of 
civic humanism, yet “the nineteenth-century form was more concerned 
with positive self-development and less exclusively preoccupied with 
self-repression.”
212
 The “model character” in Antebellum America, ob-
served Howe, “was largely independent of occupation; more or less the 
same character was thought ideal for any man, regardless of occupa-
tion.”
213
 The model of a “balanced character,” once restricted to elites, 
was democratized and (eventually) promoted among all layers of socie-
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ty.
214
 Pervasive in its appeal, “balanced character” suffused “countless 




This model of human nature received its fullest, most sophisticated 
explication from the “Scottish-American moral philosophers,” who “syn-
thesized evangelical Christianity with the science, the political liberal-
ism, and the polite standards of the Enlightenment.”
216
 Educators at 
Princeton and Yale developed a “comprehensive philosophical system” 
that embraced ethics, epistemology, religion, and metaphysics: 
The resolute confidence of the Scottish philosophical tradition that 
morality was grounded in universal common sense provided a firm 
basis upon which nineteenth-century people could pursue their cul-
tivation of the qualities of character.
217
  
Proponents termed their brand of faculty psychology “moral science” to 
distinguish it from philosophies of right and wrong. Precise taxonomies 
varied, but the moral scientists of the nineteenth century usually identi-
fied three broad categories of faculties: the moral, the rational, and the 
passionate.
218
 Their ideal postulated a hierarchy in which the moral sense 
guided one’s rational self-interest while also keeping one’s passions 
(emotions) in check. The difficulty, they realized, was that one’s pruden-
tial self-interest was buffeted between the stronger passions and the 
weaker moral sense. For this reason, “[t]he ultimate goal of the process 
of ‘self-improvement’ was to correct this problem and strengthen the 
higher faculties within the character, rendering morality superior to self-
interest and reason superior to passion.”
219
 Thus, nineteenth-century edu-
cation in all walks focused on the cultivation of the faculties. 
William Ellery Channing’s (1780–1842) essay Self-Culture both 
popularized and captured the essence of self-improvement. Channing 
found the “true greatness of human life” in our inward struggles to con-
tain our passions and self-interest.
220
 People have the “noble power” to 
not only watch their passions in play but to control and guide them, a 
                                                 
 214. Id. at 128. Howe pithily concludes that “[w]hat had once been the exclusive badge of the 
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capacity far more significant than “our power over outward nature.”
221
 
Drawing from agriculture, he urged people to “cultivate” their moral 
sense, “improving” their faculties much as a good farmer improves his 
land and livestock.
222
 Channing placed “moral sense” in the preeminent 
position among man’s sundry faculties.
223
 Historian Daniel Walker Howe 
concludes that Channing’s Self-Culture ranks “as a minor classic of 
American culture and the Protestant ethic, bridging the worlds of Benja-
min Franklin and Horatio Alger, popularizing faculty psychology, and 
synthesizing the Enlightenment with Christianity.”
224
 
Abraham Lincoln may have been the most effective advocate of a 
popularized version of self-culture. Like Channing, Lincoln seized upon 
cultivation’s dual meaning in an 1859 speech at the Wisconsin State Fair, 
where he implored the audience to cultivate their minds and faculties as 
well as their farmland. Education, Lincoln observed, yields “an exhaust-
less source of profitable enjoyment” even for farmers: 
A capacity, and taste, for reading, gives access to whatever has al-
ready been discovered by others. It is the key, or one of the keys, to 
the already solved problems. And not only so. It gives a relish, and 
facility, for successfully pursuing the [yet] unsolved ones.
225
 
In sum, character in the nineteenth century had come to mean 
something very different than it did a century earlier. The balanced-
character ideal embodied a set of values that would soon be synonymous 
with the American middle and working classes, permeating popular as 
well as more esoteric thinking.
226
 While Channing emphasized the moral 
and religious faculties, many others stressed cultivation of one’s rational 
self-interest in the name of financial, social, and even political success. It 
is hardly surprising that these same seeds of self-culture and the bal-
anced-character ideal thrived in the freshly ploughed fields of law and 
the legal profession. Evidence law adopted much of the epistemology of 
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Scottish common sense and the balanced-character model when rational-
izing and articulating the rules governing the modern trial.
227
 
2. The Modern Trial and Character Evidence 
In light of the nineteenth century’s preoccupation with character 
and penchant for re-forming people, it seems anomalous that the emer-
gent law of evidence would largely exclude proof of character. The ex-
planation rests in an understanding of the modern trial and its goal to 
search for—and find—the truth in a highly stylized, increasingly tech-
nical proceeding that curbed juries’ discretion.
228
 
Simon Greenleaf championed all of this. A staunch Whig, respected 
lawyer, and evangelical Christian, Greenleaf embraced his age’s enlight-
ened faith in the reformation of individual character through his work in 
voluntary associations related to religion and education.
229
 After building 
his legal reputation on the Maine frontier, Greenleaf joined the fledgling 
Harvard Law School faculty in the 1830s and in 1842, published the first 
American treatise on evidence law, which remained influential into the 
twentieth century.
230
 His work seamlessly melded his faith in law, evan-
gelical Christianity, and Scottish common sense. The law of evidence, 
Greenleaf believed, was nothing less than a science of proof that in 
skilled hands (his) could reveal the truth both inside and outside the 
courtroom. In an 1846 tract entitled An Examination of the Testimony of 
the Four Evangelists, Greenleaf applied evidence law to prove that Mat-
thew, Mark, Luke, and John’s gospels spoke the truth.
231
 His goal was 
not to convert unbelievers to Christianity, but to persuade his readers, 
especially intellectuals, that law was a science. Specifically, Greenleaf 
showcased evidence law as a science of historical truth predicated upon 
common sense epistemology, which, as we have seen, dominated not 
only popular culture but also nineteenth-century scientific thinking.
232
 
Greenleaf’s evidence law propelled the modern trial, which differed 
dramatically from its eighteenth-century progenitors. Judges controlled 
jury decision-making by applying increasingly elaborate rules of evi-
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dence and trial procedure as advocated by technically trained lawyers.
233
 
The trial would be a search for the historical truth, albeit one closely su-
pervised by the judge employing evidence rules.
234
 Greenleaf’s 1842 evi-
dence treatise borrowed heavily, yet reluctantly, from Thomas Starkie’s 




Unlike the older-style trial that placed a premium on a person’s 
character, the modern trial purportedly banished character inquiries from 
the courtroom. Starkie dismissed character evidence as “the last remnant 
of compurgation.”
236
 A person’s “general character” was held inadmissi-
ble in both civil and criminal cases, subject to certain exceptions.
237
 Alt-
hough a criminal defendant could offer evidence of his good character, it 
was subject to “little weight” unless the case was close.
238
 In civil cases, 
character was wholly inadmissible unless the pleadings raised it as a sub-
stantive issue (e.g., slander actions).
239
 In short, here we find the genesis 
of our current rules. 
Character proof could also be used for impeachment, a seemingly 
limited exception that may have nonetheless swallowed the exclusionary 
rule.
240
 Greenleaf pointed to a disagreement among American courts as 
to whether “general reputation or character of the witness should be re-
stricted to his reputation for truth and veracity, or may be made in gen-
eral terms, involving his entire moral character and estimation in socie-
ty.”
241
 There is a clear affinity between the “moral sense” of the Com-
mon Sense school and the law’s “entire moral character,” yet it remained 
unexplored by nineteenth-century treatise writers, including the careful 
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EVIDENCE 35–36 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson, 4th Am. ed. 1832) (criticizing character 
as proof of conduct). The fourth American edition of Starkie treats character more extensively in 2 
id., at 364–75. 
 236. THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 72, n.h. (Philadel-
phia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 8th Am. ed. 1860). “Compurgation” was trial by oath takers. 
 237. Id. at 72–73, n.h. The nineteenth-century treatises consistently attacked character evi-
dence. See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 234, at 70–72; 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES 61(1877). 
 238. STARKIE, supra note 236, at 72 n.1. 
 239. Id.; see also, 1 WHARTON, supra note 237. 
 240. See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 234, at 66, 531–33; STARKIE, supra note 236, at 207. 
 241. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 234, at 541–42 n.3. In rape cases the prevailing distrust of 
victims permitted inquiry into her “good fame” and character for “chastity.” 3 GREENLEAF, supra 
note 234, at 194–95. 
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Greenleaf.
242
 The omission may have occurred in part because the affini-
ty seemed so obvious, but also because the law’s assumption of good 
character, coupled with the general exclusion of character proof, made 
any distinction less urgent and important. 
Further limitations related to the form that character evidence might 
take even when admissible. “Character” became convertible with reputa-
tion in the community. Reputation “mean[t] the estimate attached to the 
individual by the community.” A witness’s “private opinion” was ex-
cluded, as were “facts” (i.e., specific instances) of conduct.
243
 Yet be-
cause “‘the best character is generally that which is the least talked 
about,’” parties were permitted to offer “negative evidence” to the effect 
that witnesses had not heard anything bad about the subject.
244
 
Nineteenth-century law’s general disdain for character proof is 
seemingly paradoxical. Why the turn against character proof by a society 
so enamored by character generally? Treatise writers and courts of that 
era provide little insight; glib references to an assumption of good char-
acter are accompanied by questions about its probative value as proof.
245
 
A better answer rests with the changed nature of character itself. 
The balanced-character ideal was eminently liberal, optimistic, and di-
dactic: People must strive to improve their malleable moral character to 
better themselves economically and socially. Character was not an inborn 
mainspring that determined conduct; rather, it encompassed values to 
which people aspired with full knowledge that most fell short. Reform 
associations hoped to better people through education, religion, temper-
ance, and the like. Character was malleable, which in turn meant it was 
fluid, dynamic, and unstable, so very unlike its eighteenth-century con-
ception as something inborn and largely unchanging.
246
 The dynamism of 
the balanced-character ideal helped drive the cataclysmic changes in so-
cial, economic, and cultural life, yet this same dynamism rendered char-
acter less useful to prove “facts” in a courtroom. 
The fluidity of individual character also created problems of proof. 
Was this person really honest? Diligent? Trustworthy? And if so, at what 
point in time? Moreover, Victorians feared deception and cunning, the 
imposter who presented himself as something other than who he really 
was.
247
 Phrenology offered itself as a science of character detection based 
                                                 
 242. 1 WHARTON, supra note 237, at 63 (“[T]he law presumes a party’s character to be good, 
and . . . it is superfluous for him to prove that which is presumed.”). 
 243. Id. § 49, at 63–64; see also 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 234, at 539–41; STARKIE, supra 
note 236, at 207. 
 244. 1 WHARTON, supra note 237, § 461 at 64 (quoting case law). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 247. THORNTON, supra note 152, at 94. 
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on unmalleable physical features, but neither the courts nor the public 
succumbed to its allure.
248
 The law’s insistence on community reputation 
as a means of proof provided some assurance that the person’s character 
could be fixed in time and place, yet Starkie’s allusion to compurgation, 
mentioned earlier, signaled distrust and skepticism. 
Character was also intimately associated with the old-style trial, in 
which juries had virtually free sway in deciding cases so that they could 
mitigate the harshness of eighteenth-century criminal law. Such unbri-
dled discretion became untenable by the mid-nineteenth century. Rules 
of evidence placed tighter controls on jury decision-making in criminal 
and civil trials by limiting the information the jury received about the 
parties and events.
249
 The modern trial’s search for truth focused on the 
events being litigated, not the kinds of people involved. The jury’s role 
was to determine the facts based on whatever evidence the judge permit-
ted the jury to hear, applying the law as instructed by the judge. In crimi-
nal cases, an accused’s character would be a factor for the judge to con-
sider when sentencing. 
Finally, it may be that the purported exclusion of character evidence 
may have been more apparent than real. Put differently, did the excep-
tions to character exclusion swallow the proverbial rule? Although the 
exceptions to the character ban are far fewer in number than those rid-
dling the hearsay rule, the impeachment exception is a veritable black 
hole drawing within its vortex prior criminal convictions, specific in-
stances of deceit and untruths, reputation for “truth and veracity,” and, in 
some jurisdictions, the witness’s “entire moral character.”
250
 Character, 
then, became a centerpiece of a witness’s credibility, serving as a cultural 
lie detector test. 
C. “Good Living Consistently Pursued” into the Twentieth Century 
The common law of character evidence dominated evidence law for 
much of the twentieth century, as illustrated by the work of Mason Ladd 
and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Michelson. Lost, however, was the 
nineteenth-century harmony among law, popular culture, and science. 
As a scientific construct, character had fallen from favor. The facul-
ty psychology that underwrote character’s intellectual stature faded in 
academic circles by the end of the nineteenth century. The emergence of 
modern social sciences, especially sociology and psychology, pushed 
aside the quaint eighteenth-century assumptions of the Common Sense 
                                                 
 248. Phrenology was ultimately inconsistent with the belief that character could be reformed. 
See id. at 85–86. 
 249. See NELSON, supra note 233, at 169. 
 250. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 234, § 461, at 541 n.3. 
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School in favor of more empirical methods that nonetheless failed to es-
tablish their own paradigm.
251
 Trait psychology, one of many contending 
strains at the time, retained vestiges of faculty psychology but also faded 
by the 1950s. The story is complex, but it suffices to say that character 




Although social scientists and the mental health profession scoffed, 
character retained its high standing in popular culture and law. Character 
factories like the Scouts and the YMCA remained popular.
253
 Sinclair 
Lewis’s criticisms of “Babbitism” only underscored the dominance of 
the balanced-character ideal and middle-class values in the 1920s.
254
 The 
legal profession embraced (as it still does) a requirement of “good moral 
character” as a condition of bar admission.
255
 
Writing in the late 1930s, Mason Ladd, an important figure in twen-
tieth-century evidence scholarship and legal education, exemplifies char-
acter’s revered place in law and society.
256
 Ladd’s 1939 article Tech-
niques and Theory of Character Testimony
257
 influenced the later draft-
ing of Rules 404 and 405.
258
 Focusing on the methods of proving charac-
ter while thoughtfully assessing its social role, Ladd laid bare the “odd 
result” that the form of permissible proof varies depending on how the 
party is using character proof.
259
 Ladd’s bête noire was the law’s prefer-
ence for reputation testimony over the character witness’s personal opin-
ion. When used as propensity evidence to establish the “non-probability 
that the accused committed” the crime, the defendant’s character could 
be proved through personal opinion testimony (e.g., “I believe the de-
fendant to be a law-abiding person.”) as well as by reputation. But when 
used as proof of another witness’s “credibility” (truthful character), only 
proof by reputation was permitted (e.g., “She has a reputation among our 
neighbors as a truthful person.”).
260
 This distinction, Ladd contended, 
                                                 
 251. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 185 (3d ed. 
1995). 
 252. See infra text accompanying notes 313–319. 
 253. MACLEOD, supra note 206, at 292–300.   
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BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS chart 2 and suppl. (2012), available at 
http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf. 
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 258. Edward W. Cleary, Mason Ladd—In Memoriam, 66 IOWA L. REV. 701, 702–08 (1981). 
 259. Ladd, supra note 257, at 500. 
 260. Id. 
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was irrational.
261
 Character should be provable by a personal opinion as 
well as reputation whenever character itself is admissible.
262
  
Reputation and personal opinion, Ladd argued, are but alternative 
methods of proving character. Personal opinion was at once more proba-
tive than community gossip (reputation) and had been permitted at com-
mon law until an aberrant yet influential case elevated reputation while 
demoting opinion proof.
263
 More troublingly, the law had also blurred the 




One immediately senses Ladd’s frustration in distinguishing char-
acter from its modes of proof. Character is nebulous, an “existent quali-
ty” that reveals “what a person actually is.”
265
 It presents two problems: 
“[O]ne is whether general character, if provable, is a sufficient barometer 
for predicting human action in the specific case to justify its use; the oth-




The risks, however, were worth it. Courts and juries needed the as-
sistance of character proof “in solving controversial issues” because of 
the “significant part” played by character “in all phases of business and 
social life.”
267
 Put differently, evidence law must conform with prevail-
ing social, cultural, and economic assumptions to the extent practicable. 
Although Ladd concurred that specific instances of conduct (anecdotes) 
should be severely restricted, he supported the use of “abstract observa-
tions” whether in the form of reputation or personal opinion.
268
 Of the 
two forms, Ladd preferred personal opinion: “The personal judgment of 
a qualified and reliable witness ought to be better than reputation of 
character based upon hearsay interchange of gossip of scandal in the 
community.”
269
 In short, modern conditions rendered reputation less reli-
able than the opinion of a properly qualified character witness. 
Ladd sketched the “general qualit[ies]” that comprise character in a 
manner consistent with the balanced character ideal of a century earlier. 
The law recognized that (some) people possess a “good moral character,” 
                                                 
 261. Id. The FREs permit character proof by reputation as well as personal opinion. See FED. 
R. EVID. 405, 608. 
 262. Ladd, supra note 257, at 535–36 (arguing that this would simplify the law, reduce error, 
and allow more probative evidence). 
 263. Id. at 510. 
 264. Id. at 505. 
 265. Id. at 506. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. Ladd did not, however, advocate relaxing the general ban against character evidence. 
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 269. Id. at 511. 
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which “clearly” includes the “elements” of “[h]onesty, integrity, and 
good citizenship” and are distinct from “truth and veracity.”
270
 Adding to 
the complexity, both “good moral character” and “truth and veracity” 
could be used to test a witness’s “credibility.”
271
 Proof might be made 
that a person was “quiet, peaceable, law-abiding, and inoffensive” or 
“industrious, hardworking and honest.”
272
 Distinctions among traits were 
necessary even if somewhat “artificial.” There was no precise lexicon of 
traits. Rather, such “quiddities of definition” should be eliminated in fa-




The important point is that Ladd did not question the concept of 
character itself, its role in social life, or its usefulness as proof in a court-
room. Although “modern conditions,” particularly the anonymity of ur-
ban life, made it difficult to learn about others, Ladd said it was worth 
the cost: 
[W]e have not outgrown the importance of a person’s standing in a 
community, nor can a person totally escape notice of his activities 
which depart from the norm of the social standards of those among 
whom he lives. Good living consistently pursued is recognized, and 




By equating character with a person’s “standing in a community,” Ladd 
stressed its peculiarly lay nature. He was unconvinced that modern sci-
ence could usefully assist the pursuit of truth in the courtroom. Psy-
chologists had difficulty identifying persons with “falsifying tendencies,” 
much less indicating whether they were indeed lying in a particular 
case.
275
 Nor was it remotely practical to think that psychologists could 
spend “substantial time with each witness” in each case.
276
 He also dis-
missed the helpfulness of lie detectors or “truth serums,” finding it “quite 
                                                 
 270. Id. at 500 n.6; see also id. at 498–99. Ladd distinguished among the various traits, but 
argued that the law irrationally permitted proof by reputation for all while selectively allowing per-
sonal opinion for some. 
 271. Id. at 500 n.6. 
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acter witness’s personal opinion in any event). 
 273. Id. at 528–29. Ladd, however, endorsed questions about a person’s “general reputation for 
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terms. Id. at 522–23 (emphasis in original). 
 274. Id. at 517 (emphasis added). 
 275. Id. at 533 (“There are all degrees between the truth and a lie and between people who 
falsify and those who do not.”). 
 276. Id. at 535. 
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inconceivable” that we would give “all witnesses a shot in the arm” be-
fore they took the stand.
277
 
In sum, Ladd showed that character remained a vibrant core con-
struct in evidence law, drawing its strength from lay witnesses and popu-
lar thought. Ladd accepted much of the common law doctrine while 
sharply criticizing the rules restricting methods of proof. There was, 
however, no questioning of character itself or its vitality as something 
peculiarly within the realm of lay thought.
278
 Its values remained tuned to 




A decade later, Justice Jackson’s masterful opinion in Michelson 
reveals much the same. Earlier we looked at Michelson as an example of 
how the rules of character proof worked in an average criminal case, yet 
the opinion’s true significance is its elaboration of character’s role in the 
“common law tradition.”
 280
 Departing from earlier practice, the common 
law forbade prosecutors from proving a “defendant’s evil character to 
establish his probability of guilt.” This did not mean that the law as-
sumed the defendant’s “good character” or that bad character was “irrel-
evant” to guilt.
281
 Rather, “practical experience” taught that “over-riding 
policy” concerns justified its exclusion:  
[I]t is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a 
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.
282
 
The defendant, however, may elect to prove his good character, as did 
Michelson, in the hope that it might raise a reasonable doubt. This brings 
into play yet another “anomalous rule”: the character witness’s testimony 
must be based on “hearsay,” that is, reputation. Cross-examination about 
Michelson’s 1920 arrest was lawful even though it “invited hearsay,” 
inquired about an arrest rather than a conviction, involved a crime very 
different from the charged offense, and occurred over twenty-five years 
earlier.
283
 Michelson’s own character witnesses testified to his reputation 
                                                 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 517. 
 279. Contrast the dynamism and individuality of “Bohemian culture” in the late 1800s with the 
dominant middle-class model of good character. See CHRISTINE STANSELL, AMERICAN MODERNS: 
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 280. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 471–72, 475 (1948). See supra Part II.B. 
 281. Id. at 475–76. 
 282. Id. at 476. 
 283. Id. at 481–82. 
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for good character going back thirty years; thus, the prosecutor properly 
tested their knowledge of what the community thought about him.
284
 
The Supreme Court rejected a request to restrict cross-examination 
about prior arrests to offenses similar in nature to the charged offense. 
Institutional concerns played a part: the Court’s “infrequent sallies into 
the field” of character evidence ill-equipped it to “recast the body of case 
law . . . even if it were clear what the rules should be.”
285
 Additionally, 
the paradoxical character rules themselves cautioned against piecemeal 
tampering. In Justice Jackson’s famous words: 
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the pro-
fession that much of this law [governing character proof] is archaic, 
paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which 
an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned 
counter-privilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a worka-
ble even if clumsy system. . . . To pull one misshapen stone out of 
the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present 




Michelson’s scorn targets legal doctrine and hyper-technical rules, 
not the idea of character itself. Nowhere does the Court doubt its social 
utility in daily life or character’s relevance to guilt or innocence in gen-
eral. Nowhere does the Court question the vitality of proof that one is 
truthful, honest, or law-abiding.
287
 Justice Jackson himself, who had re-
turned to the Court after serving as a prosecutor at the Nuremburg war 
crimes tribunal, invokes “evil” and “good” character without an iota of 
skepticism or cynicism.
288
 Character is assumed as something in no need 
of definition. 
Jackson did, however, wrestle with the paradoxical relationship be-
tween a person’s reputation and character. Reputation was the “shadow 
his daily has cast in his neighborhood,” not his “personality.”
289
 Moreo-
ver, the law precludes proof of character through specific instances of 
                                                 
 284. Id. at 483–85 (noting that Michelson had not objected that the 1920 arrest was too “old 
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conduct or the witness’s personal knowledge (“his own independent 
opinion”) of the subject.
290
 A character witness is “allowed to summarize 
what he has heard in the community, although much of it may have been 
said by persons less qualified to judge than himself.” Reputation, then, 
was “opinion-based-on-hearsay testimony.”
291
 It offers “practical con-
venience” by eliminating “innumerable collateral issues” that might oth-
erwise confuse the trier of fact.
292
 Reputation features the “compacting” 
of hearsay (community gossip) into the “brief phrase of a verdict.”
293
 It 
“is one of the few instances in which conclusions are accepted from a 
witness on a subject in which he is not an expert.”
294
 Jackson’s latter 




Michelson, then, roundly lambasts the “common law tradition” 
governing character proof while upholding it in the end. What the Court 
found “grotesque” were the many paradoxical rules and “illogical op-
tions” that shaped its proof at trial.
296
 Nowhere, however, did the Court 
question the nature of character itself or its value as proof. As important, 
the Michelson Court, like Mason Ladd, recognized that character was 
about one’s standing in the community. Whether it took the form of col-
lective and compacted gossip (reputation) or the personal opinion of an 
acquaintance, character arose from the community and was something 
known to lay people in lay terms. 
V. CHARACTER AND CONSTERNATION: THE UNSETTLING                           
OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 
The 1970s presented a series of watershed cultural, political, and 
legal events in the United States. In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
capped a decade-long effort to synthesize the common law into a terse, 
clear set of rules for use in the courtroom. Michelson’s “grotesque struc-
ture” benefitted from new landscaping and a fresh coat of paint but was 
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otherwise untouched.
297
 Nonetheless, social, political, and cultural shifts 
rocked the complacent assumptions buried in the new rules. 
The prime movers behind the FREs, like the Michelson Court some 
twenty-five years earlier, saw no need to define character or, for that 
matter, habit. Rather, as we have seen, the advisory committee harkened 
back to Ladd’s 1939 article and McCormick’s homey 1950s formulations 
of character as a general moral disposition, including well-recognized 
traits such as truthfulness. The advisory committee adopted not only the 
doctrinal scaffolding of the common law but also its underlying social 
and cultural assumptions as well.
298
 
Despite the law’s best efforts to stand pat, the world shifted beneath 
it. Changes afoot in the 1970s had a subtle impact on the law while riling 
the deeper waters of American society. The core middle-class values that 
dominated the American scene since before the Civil War became a crit-
ical battleground ideologically, socially, culturally, and politically. Char-
acter itself, and the values it conveyed, now became the question, not 
quaintly technical problems of proof. 
A. Character and Contemporary Academic Commentary 
Before 1950, Mason Ladd, Justice Jackson, and others spoke confi-
dently and comfortably about people’s trustworthiness, peacefulness, 
honesty, and general moral character as well as the “evil” that lurks in 
some.
299
 Such assertions are strikingly absent in recent writings on char-
acter evidence. A wide sampling of student texts and law review com-
mentary published since about 1980 reveals a number of trends that are 
discussed below.
300
 A common thread is the absence of any discernible 
consensus about the meaning of character. 
The dominant trend appears agnostic about character’s meaning. 
Character, we are told, is undefined by the rules or case law.
301
 Nor do 
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commentators fill the breach: “Unfortunately the legal literature reflects 
little effort to define character.”
302
 The implication is that a definition is 
hopeless in any event. The literature frequently settles for a string of 
nouns and adjectives describing familiar stereotypes without analyzing 
their sounding in popular thought.
303
 Character evidence is sometimes 
derisively treated as just another word for “propensity” evidence regard-
less of the “trait” involved.
304
 
A second trend, one that would have astonished the character rule’s 
Victorian progenitors, openly muses whether character has an essential 
ethical or moral component and, if it does, what its contours are. A lead-
ing text reports that “one would think” there is a link between character 
and a “person’s moral being,” but the matter is “not settled.”
305
 Others 
within this trend approach delicate questions about morality and ethics 
more obliquely. Almost apologetically, they note that character is “awk-
ward” because it “casts the speaker in a judgmental role” and, more 
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Some modern commentators are less bashful. One student textbook 
declares that “character evidence” concerns “the propensity of a person 
to act in a certain manner that makes a general statement about that per-
son and conveys a moral or ethical judgment.”
307
 This view rejects a 
“broader view of character that is not limited to morals or ethics.”
308
 Yet, 
what is meant by “ethics” or “morals”? If being “truthful” and “honest” 
qualify as character traits under this view, does this mean that being 
“thrifty,” “brave,” or “clean” do not? And for that matter, is being a 
“careful driver” a habit, a character trait, or none of the above?
309
 Recog-
nition of a moral and ethical component returns character to its nine-
teenth-century Victorian roots, but that older approach was far more en-
compassing than some of today’s stingier formulations, as best seen in its 
recognition of a “general moral character.”
310
 The current debate over an 
ethical or moral core, however defined, overlooks or perhaps deliberately 
ignores character’s roots in nineteenth-century liberalism.
311
 
In a third trend, we see evidence law’s courting of modern psychol-
ogy as the gold standard for valid, reliable rules. Some critics saw the 
FREs as a bust from the start. Robert Lawson skewered the newly-
minted FREs for their naivety and, as he saw it, appallingly retrograde 
approach to character proof.
312
 Character evidence, Lawson posits, “in-
volves the structure of human personality.”
313
 For Lawson, the FREs 
failed to consider whether modern psychology offered new approaches to 
old problems, especially the “psychological assumptions” built into the 
purported link between “general moral character” and a willingness to 
testify truthfully or untruthfully.
314
 The common law view, best ex-
pressed by Wigmore, paralleled the “prevailing scientific views” found 
                                                                                                             
Id. This latter use points to what today is called “personality” as distinguished from character. See 
infra text accompanying notes 354–357. 
 307. LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 301, at 322 (emphasis added). 
 308. Id. at 322  n. 5; see also Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Charac-
ter of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 779 (1981) (limiting character to “only those 
qualities of personality that have some moral overtone, which connote something good or bad about 
a person”). 
 309. See Hart v. State, 249 N.W.2d 810 n.9 (Wis. 1977). Relying on MCCORMICK, see supra 
text accompanying notes 92–93, the advisory committee distinguished one’s “character for care” in 
“handling automobiles” from one’s habit “of giving a left-hand signal for a left turn.” FED. R. EVID. 
406 advisory committee’s note. 
 310. See Ladd, supra note 257, at 498. 
 311. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 312. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Prob-
lem, in 30 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 758 (1975). Lawson and others criticized the FREs as a “back-
ward” step that reorganized “worn out concepts.” Id. at 758 (citation omitted). The FREs, he 
charged, “contained few notable departures from prevailing doctrine.” Id. at 763. 
 313. Id. at 759. 
 314. Id. at 760. 
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in so-called trait theory.
315
 Yet psychology at this point had largely aban-
doned general trait theory: “[T]he theory of behavior that was so compat-
ible with the law’s notion about character has ceased to have any scien-
tific recognition.”
316
 The fall from scientific grace, Lawson contended, 
undercut the law’s assumptions about a link between a person’s character 
for “veracity” or “general moral character” and their propensity to be 
truthful.
317
 Particularly vulnerable, at least on scientific grounds, was the 
law’s assumption that a prior criminal conviction affected credibility.
318
 
Lawson’s intent was “to move the law closer to truth by exposing its lack 
of knowledge about the true nature of human character and about the true 
nature of the perception of character.”
319
 
Later commentators echoed Lawson’s lament that character law is 
not moored to good science—although it remains unexplained why any 
science, good or bad, is the litmus test.
320
 These critics contend that law 
remains inexplicably “mired” in the outmoded views of trait theory.
321
 
The hope is that science will deliver us by developing tools that are both 
reliable and valid in gauging a person’s propensity to act.
322
 
                                                 
 315. Id. at 780. Lawson jabbed at Wigmore for not appreciating that both law and psychology 
shared common assumptions about character. Id.; see discussion supra Part III.A.; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 251–252. 
 316. Lawson, supra note 312, at 783. 
 317. Id. at 786. Scientific studies had “radically undercut” any assumption that “a person’s 
moral qualities are highly integrated and motivate transsituational consistency of moral behavior.” 
Id. 
 318. Id. at 787–89. 
 319. Id. at 789. 
 320. Mendez, supra note 304, at 225 (conceding the ubiquity of “character reasoning” among 
the lay public and its adoption by legal rules, but observing that such propensity inferences rest on 
untested assumptions about their probative value and “predictive quality”: “If, as a scientific matter, 
they do not [have this “predictive quality”], then the law has no business allowing parties to use 
character to prove or disprove the conduct elements of a cause of action to support or attack the 
credibility of witnesses.”); see also infra note 321; Taslitz, supra note 305, passim. For a critique of 
the law’s reliance on the “shifting consensus among psychologists,” see Melilli, supra note 111, at 
1594. If science is the standard, appeals to lay thinking probably come off as “pop psychology.” 
 321. LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 301, at 322 n.5:  
The law accepts a largely outmoded theory of character usually known as trait theory. 
That theory holds that people possess fairly consistent traits of character and that those 
traits manifest themselves, more or less, in the varying circumstances of everyday life. 
Id. The authors posit that psychologists “largely abandoned” trait theory by the mid-twentieth 
century in favor of “situationism” and more recently an approach called “interactionism.” They 
further observe that “[u]nfortunately . . . the law of evidence is still mired in trait theory.” Id. at 
322–23. For a sketch of situationism and interactionism, see infra text accompanying notes 
324–329. 
 322. See Mendez, supra note 304, at 227–235 (reviewing the psychological literature of the 
mid-1990s as it transformed from “situationism” to a view that found “relative stability and invari-
ance of the basic personality structure” that might yield “stable patterns of variability” in people’s 
conduct); see also Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1242 (2001) (laying out the competing contentions among the “situationist” 
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Edward J. Imwinkelried thoughtfully surveyed psychology’s jour-
ney over the past fifty years from trait theory to situationism and now to 
interactionism.
323
 Briefly, trait theory dominated psychology through the 
1950s, holding that the human personality exhibited stable traits to which 
human conduct conformed. Situationism dominated the 1960s and 
1970s; it rejected trait theory wholesale, contending that people’s con-
duct was largely a product of whatever situation they faced, not some 
deep-seated personality structure.
324
 Between the polar extremes of trait 
theory and situationism, a third way—interactionism—promises an “at-
tractive compromise position” based on a “growing consensus that an 
integrative model, based on the interactive interplay of character traits 
and situations cues is preferable.”
325
 Imwinkelried observes an emerging 
“taxonomy” yet cautions that much more research is needed.
326
 “Of most 
interest to legal commentators,” he remarked, “interactionists are now 
fundamentally transforming the very concept of a character trait” by 
“abandon[ing] the notion of situation-free trait descriptions.” Rather, a 
“situational component must be factored into, included in, or incorpo-
rated into the very conception of a disposition or character trait.”
327
 The 
scientific research is in its “early stages” and the field lacks consensus.
328
 
Imwinkelried concludes that interactionism, even though incipient, can 
helpfully inform evidence law in a variety of ways. Some rules must be 
recrafted or withdrawn (e.g., Rules 413 to 415); interactionism may also 
help a judge exercise her discretion when evaluating other act evi-
dence.
329
 The legal system need not fiddle while the interactionists search 
for useful tests and protocols. 
In summary, when discussing the nature of character, the dominant 
trends are as follows: (1) a studied agnosticism about whether it can be 
defined at all; (2) a robust debate—to the shock of our Victorian fore-
bears—over whether character has an essential moral or ethical core; and 
(3) an unwarranted assumption that character is or ought to be wedded to 
                                                                                                             
school and those finding more “stability” in personality). Sanchirico’s interest centers more on how 
character evidence may be used to shape conduct outside the courtroom than the nature of character 
itself. 
 323. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the Grotesque Doctrine of Character Evidence, supra note 120, 
at 747–51. 
 324. Id. at 749–51. 
 325. Id. at 754–55 (citations omitted). 
 326. Id. at 755–56. 
 327. Id. at 758. 
 328. Id. at 766. 
 329. Id. at 759–67. 
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one or another psychological school.
330
 Troublingly unappreciated is 
character’s lay nature. Some commentary is uneasy about the disjunct 
between law (which disdains the character/propensity inference, however 
defined) and popular thinking (which finds it enormously useful).
331
 Yet 
it is clear that evidence law and its commentators are reluctant to take up 
the social and cultural values inherent in the popular uses of character. 
The familiar middle-class values espoused in Michelson and by academ-
ics like Mason Ladd are passed over or ignored despite their resonance in 
the FREs. More alluring is an approach to character that is non-
ideological, value-free, and, best of all, rooted in a purportedly objective 
scientific school that is devoid of divisive social values. Why the aliena-
tion? 
B. The “Ordeal” of the Liberal Character Since the 1960s 
The Federal Rules of Evidence assumed that the common law of 
character, however grotesque its rules, would continue to prove servicea-
ble in the nation’s courtrooms. The foundation for that body of law, as 
we have seen, rested in the bedrock of a shared consensus on the prevail-
ing values of American liberalism. It stands to reason that when temblors 
shook the social and cultural foundation at liberalism’s core in the 1960s, 
these same forces would rock the law as well in the following decades. 
The purpose of this section is to sketch briefly a broad array of cultural, 
economic, and political developments that have convulsed American so-
ciety for over forty years, from the counterculture of the 1960s to the on-
going culture wars that started in the 1980s. This historical survey pro-
vides some context while inviting further research into evidence law’s 
uneasy and largely unexplored relationship with broader social and cul-
tural developments. 
Alan Brinkley, a leading historian, describes the 1960s as the “or-
deal of liberalism.”
332
 The decade saw a greater awareness of social prob-
lems, although the solutions remained elusive. Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society programs launched a war on poverty that soon became mired in 
its own quagmire as the Vietnam War sucked up money and killed thou-
sands. The drive for racial justice wracked American society as the 
Southern sit-ins and “freedom rides” of the early 1960s gave way to 
                                                 
 330. Linking character to trait psychology is, for some, a convenient way of jettisoning doctri-
nal problems that entail the messiness of dealing with current cultural and social unrest. See discus-
sion infra Part V.B. 
 331. See supra text accompanying notes 312–322. 
 332. BRINKLEY, UNFINISHED NATION, supra note 144, at ch. 31. Brinkley also uses the phrase 
to describe the career of liberal activist Allard Lowenstein. ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS ch. 13 (1998). Other historians have gone further, calling the ’60s a “civil war.” See 
MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZIN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1960S (2000). 
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pitched battles and murders in Alabama and Mississippi. Over 200,000 
demonstrators packed the National Mall in Washington D.C. to hear Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. proclaim his “dream” of racial equality in 1963, 
an event that proved to be the “high-water mark of the peaceful, interra-
cial civil-rights movement.”
333
 Landmark civil rights legislation offered 
some hope yet left unaddressed the social and economic expectations of 
black Americans. Tensions spread nationally. In 1966, dozens of riots 
erupted in cities across the nation.
334
 The ideology of “black power,” es-
poused by groups like the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam, tar-
geted white society itself as evil.
335
 
Blacks were not alone in questioning America’s core values. As the 
Vietnam War intensified, student protests convulsed college campuses 
across the county, drawing heavy media coverage. Mostly white, the pro-
testors attacked the war in a way that linked foreign policy to issues of 
racial, social, and economic injustices.
336
 The disenchantment soon 
broadened beyond the campuses. A watershed moment came in early 
1968, when the Tet Offensive stunned an American public that had been 
told that the war was being won. The assassinations of Dr. King and of 
Robert Kennedy followed by the police riot during the Democratic Con-




This radicalism triggered a response as Richard Nixon successfully 
campaigned on behalf of what he called “Middle America” and a need to 
restore order.
338
 His razor-thin 1968 election win was seen as a reaction 
to “a dangerous assault on the foundation of [American] society and cul-
ture” and a victory for “traditional values.”
339
 Yet the turbulence acceler-
ated. 
Brinkley identifies two “impulses” within this “pattern of social and 
cultural protest.” First, the “political left” strove to create a new commu-
nity of “the people” that would “break the power of elites” and promote 
racial, social, and economic justice.
340
 The political radicalism of the 
“New Left” found its strongest voice in student protests of the Vietnam 
War, the military draft, and restrictive university policies.
341
 More far 
reaching, however, was the “counterculture,” which was “openly scorn-
                                                 
 333. BRINKLEY, UNFINISHED NATION, supra note 144, at 814. 
 334. Id. at 817. 
 335. Id. at 818–19. 
 336. Id. at 827–28. 
 337. Id. at 828–31. 
 338. Id. at 832. 
 339. Id. at 836. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 836–37. 
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ful of the values and conventions of middle-class society.”
342
 To varying 
degrees, people, especially the nation’s youth, used sex, drugs, music, 
and clothing to embrace individual “fulfillment” by “rejecting the inhibi-
tions and conventions of middle-class culture.”
343
 A new generation was 
manufacturing a fresh set of social norms.
344
 
A second, “equally powerful impulse,” sought “liberation” for indi-
viduals and groups, such as Asians, Hispanics, Indians, blacks, gays, and 
women.
345
 The rekindling of the women’s movement in the 1960s, for 
example, burned deep into the fabric of the same middle-class values so 
reviled by the counterculture and the New Left.
346
 Racial and ethnic 
groups pointedly rejected the “melting pot’s” assimilationist ideal, 
choosing instead to celebrate their own “special character.”
347
 American 
culture was changing, no longer defined by those of white European de-
scent. Multiculturalism inundated American universities and politics. 




The twin impulses did not stand unchallenged. Nixon’s triumph of 
traditional values proved short lived and even farcical in the light of the 
Watergate Scandal. By the 1980s, however, those values found more 
formidable defenders in evangelical Christians and the “New Right,” 
which joined economic issues with cultural and social issues in a far 
reaching struggle that was about much more than protecting middle-class 
standards.
349
 Groups like the Christian Coalition and the Promise Keep-
ers railed against the “secular legacy” of the 1960s.
350
 The “culture wars” 
that began in the late 1980s contested “the cultural pluralism of the rapid-
ly diversifying American population.”
351
 Some feared the decline of 
community itself, as Americans elected to “bowl alone” rather than join 
                                                 
 342. Id. at 383. 
 343. Id. at 838–39. 
 344. Id. at 839. 
 345. Id. at 836. 
 346. Id. at 848–49. 
 347. Id. at 845. 
 348. Id. at 911. 
 349. See BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 332, at 292–96 (discuss-
ing religious fundamentalism and its uneasiness with “modernism”). 
 350. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 257. As Patterson colorfully puts it, critics on the right saw 
only “pot smoking, bra burning, love beads, radical feminism, black power, crime in the streets, 
pornography and sexual license, abortion, family decline, Darwinian ideas of evolution, and gross-
out popular culture.” Id. 
 351. BRINKLEY, UNFINISHED NATION, supra note 144, at 911. 
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others on teams or leagues.
352
 Fights over “political correctness” reveal 
“a painful change in the character of American society.”
353
 
This fragmentation of social ties leads some critics to wonder 
whether “character” is being replaced by “personality,” although the two 
seem to overlap. The nineteenth and most of the twentieth century was “a 
culture of character,” which “came to mean a group of traits believed to 
have social significance and moral quality.”
354
 Character was “a method 
for both mastery and development of the self” in a society that stressed 
work and producer values.
355
 By contrast, personality emphasizes the 
qualities that make one unique and different. It offers a very different 
definition of self, one that from the start was closely associated with 
emerging thought in psychology and psychiatry. While character empha-
sizes duty, honor, and obedience to law, personality is “essentially anti-
nomian,” stressing the “importance of being different, special, unusual, 
of standing out in a crowd.”
356
 Percolating since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, personality offers a competing vision of “self” to that of character, 
one well suited to a “consumer mass society.”
357
 
Battles over sex on television, provocative art, and school curricu-
lums sometimes dominate the media but should not overshadow that the 
United States retains a “large cultural center.”
358
 The cultural divide did 
not necessarily pit “character” against “no character” (or “personality” 
for that matter). Instead, the issues pooled around what content character 
should carry. Clearly, the values and standards of the 1950s had been 
transformed by the 2000s. As shown previously, Burnett and his fellow 
jurors valued character proof and openly disdained the law’s futile at-
tempts to eliminate it. Burnett’s musings about the “gender-bender” wit-
nesses nicely captures how character has evolved over the decades.
359
 
In sum, since the 1960s, a series of convulsions have rent the social 
fabric. The middle-class values that had once seemed so uncontroversial 
and obvious are now contested and occasionally reviled by many and just 
                                                 
 352. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000). 
 353. BRINKLEY, UNFINISHED NATION, supra note 144, at 911. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, 
JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 163 (W.W. Nor-
ton & Co. 1998) (1991) (harshly critiquing multiculturalism and contrasting the approaches to “polit-
ical correctness” by the left and the right). 
 354. WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY 273 (1984).  
 355. Id. at 273–74; see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 143 (1995) (“In the 19th century, the middle class justified itself with 
concepts of Character . . . .”). 
 356. SUSMAN, supra note 354, at 277–80. 
 357. Id. at 280. 
 358. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 291 (emphasis in original). 
 359. BURNETT, supra note 64, at 51–57. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
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as passionately defended by others. The law’s conception of “character” 
embraces these disputed values. It is little wonder that the law doused the 
controversy as best it could with pails full of ambiguity, cant, and a fer-
vent prayer that psychology and the neurosciences might soon deliver a 
better solution. 
VI. CHARACTER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONCLUSIONS       
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
Curiously, the law of evidence is uncomfortable with popular 
thought and culture.
360
 We invite lay people into the courtroom as wit-
nesses and jurors yet, like rude hosts, demand they abandon familiar 
ways of thinking, especially with regard to character. They can’t and 
won’t. It is time, then, to rethink character proof in a way that acknowl-
edges the salience (and limits) of lay fact-finding. 
In light of the law’s futile efforts to ban most forms of character ev-
idence, some commentators have gone in the opposite direction, arguing 
that the propensity rule itself should be jettisoned. It does seem to be a 
good thing, however, that prosecutors are barred from calling character 
witnesses who would brand the defendant with hurtful stereotypes (i.e., 
name calling via character traits), despite having no knowledge of the 
charged crime itself.
361
 The current rule also regulates the tenor and con-
tent of closing arguments, inducing lawyers to argue facts instead of 
hurling invective and calling people names. Yet this regulation begs 
whether the propensity rule really matters in light of its broad exceptions, 
glaring evasions, and clash with common sense and life experience. 
Richard Uviller notes that “[t]he human mind instinctively seeks person-
ality predicates for the inferences of behavior,” a view surely seconded 
by juror/historian Burnett.
362
 Writing in the early 1980s, Uviller contend-
                                                 
 360. This is strikingly evident in the embrace of summary judgment and emergence of highly 
technical evidence rules—especially the “gatekeeping” rules governing expert testimony—designed 
to augment judicial “fact” finding and summary judgment. 
 361. For similar reasons, courts sometimes ban guilt-assuming hypotheticals during cross-
examination of defense character witnesses. See United States v. Guerrero, 665 F.3d 1305, 1312 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between “opinion” and “reputation” testimony but finding no error 
in any event). 
 362. H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN 
AMERICA 240 (1996). “The underlying behavioral assumptions” of the character rules, says Uviller, 
“can only be described as bizarre, and the rules that have sprouted from them are arcane and arbi-
trary, undermining all the claims of jurisprudence to rationality and predictability.” He asks further 
whether “we in litigation” are really trying to reconstruct “real events involving human actors” or 
instead “like modern medieval monks, trying to reconcile artificial doctrine with imaginary behav-
ior . . . .” Id. He closes by suggesting we scrap the propensity rule in favor of reposing discretion in 
judges. Id. 
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ed that “[p]redisposition, so long a pariah in the law of evidence, must be 
reclaimed from the shadows.”
363
 
How do we “reclaim” character or at least acknowledge its lurking 
presence in the courtroom’s shadows? Of prime importance, we must 
recognize character’s roots in today’s society and culture. Lay fact-
finders apply their common sense and life experiences when listening to 
testimony by lay witnesses, which is often the predominant source of 
proof, especially in criminal cases. Burnett’s astute observations about 
how his jury decided a murder case vividly underscore that character in-
ferences are drawn regardless of whether formal proof is introduced by 
the lawyers and in the face of jury instructions telling them not to: We 
need to know “what kind” of people are involved in the case. The pro-
pensity rule eliminates most avenues of formal character proof, yet there 
are numerous back-alleys through which the jury learns about the 
“kinds” of people involved as witnesses or parties. “In everyday life,” 
observes Edward Imwinkelried, “we commonly rely on character reason-
ing.”
364
 Jury instructions will not and cannot change this. Other commen-
tators also acknowledge that “‘character’ and ‘propensity’ are ubiquitous, 




The disjunct between legal reasoning and common experience is 
disquieting yet usually defended, unconvincingly, on grounds that deci-
sions in the courtroom are fundamentally different from those in every-
day life.
366
 Confining character to lay evidence hedges against over-
                                                 
 363. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injus-
tice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 883 (1982). Uviller concluded: 
In sum, character evidence cannot and should not be banished from the field of proof. 
Humans have always sought to read one another’s character and often base important de-
cision on these judgments. Inescapably, character does tend to prove a fact to which it 
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Id. at 890. 
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 366. See PARK ET AL., supra note 301, § 5.04, at 130: 
When formal judgments affect a person’s life or freedom, some kinds of considerations 
should be out of bounds. But it is appropriate to examine evidence of character in our dai-
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reliance on such proof. Although Burnett was initially bowled over by 
allegations that the victim may have attacked another young man, on fur-
ther reflection, he deeply discounted this evidence.
367
 Not all jurors will 
have Burnett’s fact-finding facility, but the larger lesson is that common 
sense and life experiences teach us to handle such anecdotes carefully. 
“Background” evidence should be acknowledged as character evidence. 
Cross-examination, closing arguments, and frank instructions that warn 
about the weaknesses of character inferences will protect against over-
valuing such evidence but only if we first honestly acknowledge it for 
what it is—character. 
From this, it also follows that psychology is not the answer. Char-
acter is a lay construct and should be confined to lay terms. Character 
witnesses offer their opinions of the subject, as Theodore Roosevelt did, 
based on personal dealings or their sense of the subject’s reputation. Psy-
chologists’ assumptions are based in objective scientific research, not 
community gossip built on myriad daily interactions among lay people. 
This is not to say that psychologists have nothing useful to offer about 
propensity; rather, their evidence should be (closely) scrutinized for what 
it is, namely, expert testimony subject to the reliability analysis under 
Rule 702.
368
 Should a psychologist testify that only a Ph.D. in psycholo-
gy has anything useful to say about propensity, historian Burnett might 
be called to impeach the testimony. 
As a lay construct, character must be attuned to today’s society and 
culture, which is difficult given its unsettled state. Struggles among legal 
commentators to define character, including whether it has a “moral” 
component, have arisen in part because it is often couched in a lexicon of 
a very different time and place. Greenleaf’s reference to one’s “entire 
moral character” made sense in the 1840s and apparently the 1940s but 
seems a mystery today. The United States, historians tell us, maintains a 
                                                                                                             
ly lives when deciding diverse matters, such as whom to hire as a babysitter or whom to 
entrust with a bank deposit. Nobody would deign to tell us we should not do so, and any 
effort to regulate our behavior to prevent us from considering such qualities would neces-
sarily fail. Moreover, we can live comfortably with inaccuracy in this realm of private 
behavior. If it turns out that the information received about the person’s past behavior or 
general character is simply wrong, the error will usually cause a relatively small degree 
of harm (though at times the harm can be great, as in marriage or employment decisions). 
It would thus be impractical, intrusive, and of little actual value to try to regulate the use 
of character evidence in the private dealings of daily life. 
Id. The problem arises, however, because the law chooses to “regulate” in the courtroom how most 
people think outside the courtroom; the results are artificial rules and unhelpful fictions. Moreover, 
selecting a babysitter is among the most important decisions a parent makes, and it is usually based 
on personal contacts or references—namely, “character witnesses.” 
 367. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
 368. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 991 (2007). 
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“large cultural center,” albeit one that is earnestly contested and continu-
ally evolving.
369
 Legal commentators justifiably complain about the “se-
mantic” problems and careless usage by which we describe character 
traits.
370
 Yet the problem is likely more one of generational trends; values 
that made sense in the 1930s are not always applicable today.
371
 Bur-
nett’s casual reference to “gender-bender” witnesses would likely mysti-
fy the Michelson Court, yet today’s average teenager, broadly educated 
in the popular culture through social media, would be instantly familiar 
with such labels. Moreover, educational organizations and public com-
mentators vigorously support instilling modern notions of character into 
the nation’s youth as an answer to contemporary social problems.
372
 As 
character evolves, so must evidence law. 
So too, distinctions between character and personality should be 
plumbed by evidence scholars. Socially, culturally, and historically, 
character and personality point in different directions, the one oriented at 
group behavior and the other at individuals.
373
 We may find, for example, 
that character traits (social judgments) are best expressed through reputa-
tion testimony while personality traits (an individual’s unique qualities) 
are better left to lay opinions (if not expert opinions). In sum, the chal-
lenge is to recognize that character is fluid and dynamic, a product of 
prevailing society and culture, which will be expressed in those terms. 
Our lexicon of character traits clearly needs rethinking, especially 
in light of the social transformations of the last fifty years. What are to-
day’s “pertinent” character traits, as required by Rule 404(a)? Burnett’s 
reference to the gender-benders is, once again, a vivid reminder that ju-
ries draw character inferences regardless of formal proof or jury instruc-
tions telling them not to. It also teaches us that the social and cultural 
divisions of the last thirty years necessitate sensitivity to diverse commu-
nities and groups, particularly those not attuned to traditional middle-
class values. No definitive list is possible or even desirable.
 374
 It is likely 
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that the old doctrine—a facial but ineffectual prohibition on character 
evidence—survived as long as it did because it leaked so badly, allowing 
courts to account for contemporary attitudes and norms. If character is 
socially constructed—what others think of a person—the vocabulary will 
be that of the group as expressed by the witness. Nonetheless, some 
“traits” may be ripe for pruning. 
The eminently Victorian trait for “truthful character,” for example, 
is queued for reconsideration. At common law the trait for “truth and 
veracity” stood alongside that of “good moral character,” which included 
“elements” of “honesty, integrity, and good citizenship” that in turn re-
lated to “the probability of one’s telling the truth.”
375
 Today’s rules still 
recognize a trait for truthful character. As we have seen, Rules 608 and 
609 are exceptions to the propensity rule and convenient avenues for par-
ties, especially prosecutors, to flood courtrooms with misconduct evi-
dence, including prior criminal convictions and deceitful behavior.
376
 Yet 
what does such evidence tell us about credibility? Do we really need this 
type of proof to know that a person may have a “propensity to lie,” a 
“fact” shared by all humans?
377
 Or is this evidence just the law’s conven-
ient rationalization for informing the jury that the witness skews low on 
the social score card? 
There are other candidates for woodshedding. Rules 413–415 foster 
broad propensity inferences about alleged sex offenders. It rests on spot-
ty social science research, as has been observed, but what about popular 
attitudes about repeat offenders?
378
 Recall that Burnett’s jury wondered 
whether the shooting victim had lured and sexually attacked other men 
on prior occasions and felt vindicated when they later learned of one pos-
sible incident. Such problematic evidence is better left to the judge’s 
broad discretion under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. 
Negotiating the sinkhole that is Rule 404(b) can begin with a frank 
acknowledgment that limited admissibility is a chimera. Other act evi-
dence is almost always relevant to character despite its proffer to prove 
intent, knowledge, plan etc. When assessing admissibility, particularly 
under Rule 403, the judge should assume that the jury will also draw a 
character inference alongside of the proffered purpose, not pretend that it 
won’t, and instruct accordingly. 
In recognizing that character is a social construct, it is imperative 
that reputation and personal opinion testimony are taken seriously. Simp-
ly put, character translates to what other people think of the subject. 
                                                 
 375. Id. at 500 n.6. 
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Foundations for opinion and reputation testimony should not be pro for-
ma. Rather, judges should adopt a gatekeeping role in much the same 
way they are compelled to do when policing expert testimony. If reputa-
tion is gossip, the judge should find that the trait was actually discussed 
(“gossiped about”) within a group (no gossip, no reputation). Reputation 
should be approached as a decidedly unscientific, ad hoc survey of fami-
ly, co-workers, friends, etc.
379
 Banned too should be testimony that the 
witness “never heard anything bad” because this may point only to the 
absence of an identifiable community or the witness’s ignorance of any 
ad hoc survey. Although reputation is crude, lay factfinders are familiar 
with its weaknesses and foibles. 
Similarly, lay opinion testimony requires that the witness have suf-
ficient personal knowledge of the subject’s pertinent traits to provide a 
helpful (useful) opinion. How long, how well, and in what way do they 
know each other? Specific instances (anecdotes) may not be used on di-
rect examination under the FREs, but there should be some assurance of 
sufficient contacts to support an opinion where one is permitted by the 
judge. Lay opinion at its basest may amount to little more than name 
calling, but here, too, the lay factfinders’ familiarity with its problems 
coupled with exposure of a witness’s bias are usually sufficient. 
Additionally, social media must be accounted for in recalibrating 
the foundations for opinion and reputation testimony. Classic opinion 
and reputation rested on face-to-face contact, the proverbial backyard 
fences across which neighbors gossiped, but the urbanization and digital-
ization of society has changed this dynamic. Critics, particularly Mason 
Ladd and the Michelson Court, decried reputation proof because the ano-
nymity of urban life rendered it a bygone relic of rural America.
380
 Tech-
nology, though, may resurrect reputation without forcing a return to the 
farm. Social media, such as Facebook, have created cyber-communities 
that foster close, even intimate, relationships that may substitute for the 
fences and church socials of our fancied past. 
The trial is a device for lay fact-finding. While it has dramatically 
evolved over the last 200 years, the trial remains a place where lay deci-
sion makers are given voice. The law of evidence is built upon accom-
modating lay observations (testimony) and lay decision making (ver-
dicts) with legal policy. The unworkable fictions of current law must be 
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replaced with more serviceable rules that reflect and respect how lay 
people think. Character is a good place to start. 
 
